FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1194253-0

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Page 9 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 10 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 11 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 12 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 125 ~ Duplicate;
Page 174 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 175 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 176 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
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New York, N. Y.

OHS:PS
100-2802

January 3, 1941.

Special Agent in Charge
Albany, New York

Re: INSURANCE ADJUSTERS - INFORMANTS;
National Defense Matters.

Dear Sir:

In connection with the above, it is desired to obtain a list of the licensed public adjusters of New York City. This list may be obtained from the License Bureau, Department of Insurance, Albany, New York.

It is requested that you obtain this list and forward it to the New York Office at your earliest convenience.

Very truly yours,

B. F. SACKETT
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 28420 mc
mc/JC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
6 JAN 7 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

cc: Bureau

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CHC:TD

June 3, 1940

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nathan
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Transmitted herewith is a list with regard to confidential informants currently being paid on a regular salary basis, together with a separate list concerning confidential informants being paid varying sums upon a more or less regular basis in connection with information furnished by them.

Respectfully,

H. H. Clegg

Inclosure

NOLD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 MAR 4 1944
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 6, 1940 74390

LBN:AWN

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

O. T. Wingo advised that a Mr. Hayden who is now an American correspondent for the Chicago News, inaugurated a system of Friday luncheons attended by Ambassadors, Ministers, Embassy officials, Secretaries and the like, representing the countries in the Western Hemisphere. There is a total of 103 individuals who attend these luncheons from time to time. They have between fifteen and twenty at each luncheon and they discuss Western Hemisphere affairs.

This is purely an informal group and the thought occurs to me that it might be possible to utilize Mr. Wingo's contact to very good advantage.

He has been very active in helping out on various occasions during the past several months. I have found him to be thoroughly reliable and I would be glad to approach him on any matter wherein it was felt that he could be of assistance.

Respectfully,

L. B. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 DMD/MC/JM

12-23-40

RECORDED
INDEXED

66-25 42-3-2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 DEC 14 1940
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON TAMM FOXWORTH CHF. CLERK

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

San Diego, California

December 11, 1940

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED
AND [illegible]
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Class. FC
DATE 10/6/8

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
IN MEXICO

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the letter from the San Diego Field Division to the Bureau dated December 11, 1940 in the matter entitled "COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO" wherein reference is made to Confidential Informant [redacted] and Confidential Informant [redacted] (U)

For the Bureau's information, Confidential Informant [redacted] is [redacted] San Diego, California, and Confidential Informant [redacted] is [redacted] San Diego, California. (U)

b6
b7C
b7D

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 pm/mc/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2.3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

Very truly yours,

H. R. DUFFEY
Special Agent in Charge

FCD:jec

ORIGINAL FILED IN

66-2542-3-2X
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEB 11 1941
U. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

ADDRESS DATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF Class
DATE 8/31/82

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - S

JTM:ML
COORDED 66-2542-3-2X
~~66-2542-3-15-1X1~~

May 19, 1941

21098

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 DMD/mc/JC
ON 7-10-81

Special Agent in Charge
Detroit, Michigan

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letters dated September 9, 1940 and December 11, 1940, in which you submitted information regarding confidential informants who were to be utilized by your office.

From a review of these communications, it is noted that insufficient background information was submitted concerning these individuals.

The entire lists submitted by you should be carefully reviewed and revised lists furnished to the Bureau at the earliest possible date, designating symbols for those individuals who are to be utilized by your office as confidential national defense informants. In submitting your revised lists, you should use the same symbol numbers as set forth in the above reference letters. Those individuals who should be termed as sources of information should be deleted from the lists and carried in your source of information file.

For your guidance in determining whether you should consider an individual as a source of information or as a confidential national defense informant, you should ascertain if he has any objection to the disclosure of his identity. If such is not the case, he may be classified as a source of information.

I desire to point out that it is necessary to conduct an appropriate background investigation concerning each individual who is to be utilized as a confidential national defense informant or as a confidential plant informant. Background data should include each individual's date and place of birth and some indication as to his place of residence over a period of years.

The above should receive your immediate attention and the information requested should be forwarded to the Bureau as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Mendes
Mr. Tracy

APPROPRIATE [illegible]
AND FIELD [illegible]
ADVISED [illegible]
SLIP(S) OF Class. File
DATE 10/6/8

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-3-15-1X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Coxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Clavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

21099

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Detroit - Michigan
December 11, 1940

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 P.O.W. JMC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-81

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED BY 3042 P.O.W./RC
ON 4-1-86

FILE

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS Gen Intell, Morf

Dear Sir:

In further reference to my previous letters wherein there were submitted lists of regularly used confidential informants in this district, I am at this time submitting the following names of additional confidential informants with their designations as they will be known to the Bureau and to this office when used in the future.

Designation: [redacted]

[redacted] Detroit, Michigan

Trinity 2-9386

Type of information expected:
Information regarding individual Communists in this district and their activities.

Service continuous or intermittent:
Services intermittent

Remuneration:
No payments or expenses have as yet been required.

General statement:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
6 JAN 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IDENT. UNIT
FIVE
CONFIDENTIAL

UNRECORDED

100-351123-

CONFIDENTIAL

(Letter to the Director from the SAC, Detroit, dated December 11, 1940)

Confidential Inf

Designation: [redacted] 07

[redacted] Detroit, Michigan

66-2542-7014

Tyler 5-5693

[redacted]

card

b6
b7C
b7D

Confidential Inf

Designation: [redacted] 07

[redacted] Detroit, Michigan

Temple 1-9188

Type of information expected:
Information regarding individual Communist [redacted] this district and their activities.

Service continuous or intermittent:
Services intermittent.

Remuneration:
No payments or expenses required.

General statement:

[redacted]

card

Checked previously see 66-2542-3-15-8

Very truly yours,

John S. Bugas

John S. Bugas
Special Agent in Charge

RTR:ed

CONFIDENTIAL

COP
hv

January 10, 1941 21094

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

At the request of Mr. Nichols the writer on the afternoon of January 9, 1941 attended a meeting in Mr. Nichols' office at which time a discussion was had concerning the handling of confidential informants. Also present at this meeting were Messrs. Tracy, Belmont, Patterson, Waikart, and later in the meeting Mr. Holloman was requested by Mr. Nichols to come to his office.

Mr. Nichols stated that during the recent inspection which was made of the Supervisors' offices, it was found that there were numerous serials pertaining to confidential informants which had not yet been recorded. It was explained to Mr. Nichols that in accordance with the previous ruling of the Executive Conference these serials were not to be recorded until the symbol of the informant had been blocked out. Since Mr. Belmont is not authorized to prepare cards until each of the cards is approved by you, it is necessary to make the necessary search of the files and take appropriate action concerning each of these letters before the informant can be approved and forwarded to Mr. Belmont to prepare the informant card. There is, therefore, considerable delay in having these serials recorded and this accounts for the reason that the serials located by Mr. Nichols and his assistants had not been previously recorded. Mr. Nichols stated he did not approve of this practice and believed that the serials should be recorded immediately upon receipt in the Bureau and Mr. Tracy concurred.

Mr. Nichols and Mr. Tracy stated they intended to recommend to the Executive Conference that confidential informant mail in the future be handled the same as any other regular mail and that it be recorded immediately upon receipt. They both stated they see no objection to recording the name and the symbol in the Files Section. It would appear to the writer that this practice is desirable and it was recommended in my previous memorandum.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMO/MC/JC

RECORDED & INDEXED

5/22/58

-3

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF

The writer and Mr. Belmont were then questioned concerning their respective duties and Mr. Belmont explained that he had previously handled confidential informants in Division Five and that pursuant to the instructions of the Executive Conference, when the recording of confidential informants on index cards was transferred to the Chief Clerk's Division, Mr. Belmont was also assigned the work in that Division. He stated that the duties in the Chief Clerk's Office in connection with confidential informants required about one and one-half hours a day but that his function is merely a supervisory one and that he has two clerks and a stenographer employed in his office who prepare the cards and handle the other routine duties. Mr. Belmont examines the cards after they are prepared from the correspondence and makes such deletions or additions as he deems advisable. The writer informed Messrs. Tracy and Nichols that in addition to acting as Relief Supervisor in Division Five he has the duties of handling correspondence and supervision of informants on National Defense matter generally. He also informed them that the matter of Plant informants is handled under Mr. Holloman's supervision in the Plant Survey Unit.

Mr. Tracy stated that this necessitated an extra routing of the mail and further delayed the serials from going to file and further he did not believe that this was a function which should be performed in the Chief Clerk's Division. He pointed out that these cards are of no use to the Chief's Office and are maintained there only as a reservoir of information for ready reference. He stated it was his opinion that these cards since they are maintained primarily for the National Defense Division should be under your supervision and should be handled in Division Five. He also recommended that all matters pertaining to National Defense informants including Plant informants be handled in one unit so that there will be one complete index concerning all informants. He, of course, did not comment as to where this should be handled in the National Defense Division.

Mr. Nichols concurred in his suggestion stating that payments to informants would all be authorized by correspondence and that this correspondence should be routed to the Chief Clerk's Office so that proper approval could be had on blue slips but that he could not see any other purpose for keeping these cards in the Chief Clerk's Division and said that they should properly be located in the National Defense Division.

21096

Mr. Tracy and Mr. Nichols stated that they would both make the following recommendations to the Executive Conference in the next day or two:

1. That all confidential mail pertaining to confidential informants be recorded immediately upon receipt in the Bureau and that the names and symbols of all confidential informants be indexed in the Files Section from each piece of correspondence.

2. That the confidential informants' index cards which are presently being maintained by Mr. Belmont in the Chief Clerk's Division be transferred to the National Defense Division where the cards for the Plant informants and other informants generally will be maintained in one unit.

A discussion was had between Mr. Tracy and Mr. Belmont concerning the advisability of Division One Maintaining a similar index on confidential informants used in that Division and Mr. Tracy stated he could see no necessity for handling Division One informants in this manner. It was explained by Mr. Belmont that in the past the Director on at least one or two occasions has requested information concerning the number of paid informants employed and also the amount paid to those informants on the regular basis. Mr. Tracy stated he believed the Director was interested primarily in securing information concerning informants used for National Defense matters. Mr. Tracy pointed out that informants used in Division One are indexed in the Files Section and their symbols are also indexed. Therefore, if a Supervisor in Division One is desirous of ascertaining the identity of an informant mentioned in an investigative report he can do so by telephoning the Files.

Mr. Belmont insisted, however, that he believed it desirable to handle all informants in a uniform manner and that index cards should be maintained on general informants as well as informants used in National Defense matters.

21097

Mr. Holloman explained the manner in which informants are handled in the Plant Survey Section; that is, that the names are checked against the Files' indices and then any detrimental information concerning them is set forth in a memorandum to you. If there is no detrimental information in the Files, the correspondence is routed to you for your approval and if approved is then sent to Mr. Belmont for recording on the index cards. The writer informed them that this practice also prevailed concerning National Defense informants generally.

Mr. Holloman also pointed out that he presently has two Supervisors presently assigned to the handling of Plant informants and there are presently recorded some 7000 of this type of informant. He estimated that this would be increased in the future to some 20,000 and Mr. Belmont stated that in addition to this there would be approximately 1500 to 1800 informants used on National Defense matters generally.

Mr. Holloman also pointed out that if the informants index file is maintained in his unit or elsewhere in the National Defense Division, it would be necessary to have additional personnel inasmuch as the Supervisors in his unit presently handling this matter could not possibly handle the increased work.

It would, therefore, appear that if the informant index is transferred to the National Defense Division that there should be at least two additional supervisors assigned full time to this matter. I have been advised by Mr. Belmont's clerk that he spends full time on the handling of these informants. There are also two girls in the office who assist him at various intervals. This clerk also takes some dictation from Mr. Belmont in connection with confidential informants.

Respectfully,

/s/ R. J. Brandt
R. J. Brandt

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT PITTSBURGH, PA, 74386 FILE NO. 100-44

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
PITTSBURGH, PA.	1-20-41	10-31; 11-30-40	D. DiLILLO

TITLE [redacted]

CHARACTER OF CASE: INTERNAL SECURITY - I

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Name of [redacted] furnished to Pittsburgh Office by Bureau office at San Diego, as that of person who might be developed as confidential informant at Vandergrift, Pa. [redacted] reported by local police as a person of good reputation, will be contacted as possible source of information in matters pertaining to Internal Security and will be developed as confidential informant, if deemed advisable.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd mc/JC

b7D

- P -

REFERENCE: Letter dated at San Diego, Cal., September 6, 1940.

DETAILS: The letter of reference informed that confidential informant [redacted] of the San Diego Office, whose identity is known to the Bureau, furnished the name of [redacted] whose [redacted] a resident of Vandergrift, Pa., where he is in the wholesale leather business, who could possibly be contacted as source of information and eventually developed as confidential informant.

It was suggested by the San Diego Office that preliminary inquiry be made to determine the reliability of [redacted] prior to making contact with him, and that the San Diego Office be advised if the Pittsburgh Office would not deem it desirable to approach [redacted] as suggested.

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: [signature] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

66-2542-3 JAN 31 1941

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San Diego (Inf.)	2
Pittsburgh	2

EAB

JAN 28 1941

FIVE

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74387

With further reference to [redacted] informant [redacted] of the San Diego Office, advised that [redacted] is a loyal citizen of the United States and active in Italian-American groups in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. The informant advised that [redacted] may be depended upon for accurate information, that he is a member of [redacted] and active in Lutheran Church circles and civic affairs. The informant advised also that [redacted] has very fine cultural feeling towards Italy, but that he is not friendly to Fascism; that his feeling for Italian cultural ideas may have at times been misinterpreted for loyalty to the Italian government, but that he, the informant, is certain that this is untrue. The informant claimed to have known [redacted] for [redacted] b7D

In line with present Bureau policy, the matter was referred on October 25, 1940 to Chief County Detective ARTHUR B. TURNER, of Westmoreland County at Greensburg, Pa., with the request that he conduct a discreet inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the reputation of Mr. KYLE in Vandergrift.

Chief County Detective TURNER advised in letter received at the Pittsburgh office on October 31, 1940 that [redacted] is one of the [redacted] Vandergrift, Pa., and is reputed to be the best citizen in that community. [redacted] who has been in the wholesale leather business for [redacted] in Vandergrift.

The report of Chief County Detective TURNER advised that all persons interviewed spoke very highly of [redacted] and that all stated that he is a loyal citizen and a good business man. Mr. TURNER concluded: "His loyalty to this country and his community, Vandergrift, is unquestionable, according to statements made to us by respected citizens of that locality."

UNDEVELOPED LEADS

THE PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

AT VANDERGRIFT, PA., will call upon [redacted] at his place of business and through conversation had with him will determine whether he may be willing to be used as a source of information and, eventually, as a confidential informant in matters over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. b7D

- P E N D I N G -

FGMcG:BK January 13, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

The following information has been received by the Bureau from an unknown outside source under date of January 6, 1941:

Girard Angelot, 628 Himrod Ave., Youngstown, Ohio, commander of Post No. 39 Italian-American World War Veterans of the United States, Inc., states that his organization throughout the United States, those who served in the U. S. Army during the World War, are devoting their time combatting the fascist agitation of the Italian World War Veterans, those who served in the Italian Army during the World War. Both of these organizations have strong units in Youngstown. Angelot states that his organization is cooperating with the F.B.I. Angelot is employed as a tailor."

Respectfully,

F. G. McGeary

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 BY 28422 mc/mc JC

RECORDED & INDEXED 66-2512-3-5

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Kathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

KB
2542-3

January 30, 1941

Honorable Francis Maloney
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I am in receipt of your letter dated January 23, 1941 and its enclosures which were copies of letters received by you from Mr. William J. Rapp, Counsellor at Law, 60 Wall Street, New York City, New York.

I sincerely appreciate your thoughtfulness in furnishing me copies of these letters and I desire to advise that Mr. Rapp will be interviewed within the near future to ascertain if he has any information of value. Arrangements will also be made to contact his informant for such information as she may be able to furnish.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2542pmd/mc/JC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Mendon
Rosen
Tracy
Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JAN 30 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ROBERT F. WAGNER, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
CARTER GLASS, VA.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
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JOHN A. DANAHER, CONN.
ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO

PHILIP LEVY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY

January 23, 1941

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

For your information and such consideration as you may feel the matter deserves, I am sending you herewith copies of two letters which I have received from Attorney William J. Rapp, 60 Wall Street, New York, New York.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Maloney

Francis Maloney
U. S. Senate

MMW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PWJ/mcl
JC

ENCL. FM

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

66-2542-3-6
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
4 JAN 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE

1-28-41 AM

Letters to Sen Maloney + to N.Y. Office 1/30/41
R. J. B.

COPY

WILLIAM J. RAPP
Counsellor at Law

60 Wall Street, New York

January 16th, 1941

Honorable Francis Maloney
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator:

Here is something I think will interest you.

As you know being a member of The Lambs I come into contact with many people in the theatrical world and about a week ago a woman entertainer was telling me of an incident that she recalled quite distincly having happened on last St. Patrick's Day in Newark.

She was entertaining employees of the Hercules Powder Company at the Hotel Douglass, Newark, New Jersey. I presume it was a smoker. At any rate she has funny stories she tells and she gets a great many laughs from the audience. She noticed during the course of her act that when she told her story and the time came to laugh, everyone in the audience did laugh excepting one particular group so she asked why they didn't laugh. She was told to her surprise that they didn't understand English, that they were foreigners. I think she said they were German.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

/signed/ William J. Rapp

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMW
mcl JC

COPY

WILLIAM J. RAPP
Counsellor at Law

60 Wall Street, New York

January 20th, 1941

Honorable Francis Maloney
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

Replying to your favor of the 17th, I would say that it seems advisable that the matter be referred to the Department of Justice and they will receive whole-hearted cooperation on the part of my informant.

The lady speaks English, German and Spanish. Due to her type of entertaining, she might prove a very valuable under-cover aid. She does not drink and is the mother of a son, who is at the present time attending one of the mid-western colleges, although she does not look her age.

She recently entertained at some sort of a dinner function at which Mr. Knudsen was either the guest of honor or one of the guests of honor.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

/signed/ William J. Rapp

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 RMJ
mc/JC

COPY
hvw

21093

FGMcG:BK

January 15, 1941

RECORDED 66-2542-3-5

Special Agent in Charge
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Sir:

Information has been received by the Bureau that Girard Angelot, 628 Himrod Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio, who is employed as a tailor, is the Commander of Post Number Three, Italian-American World War Veterans of the United States, Incorporated, and he has stated that this organization's membership consists of those individuals who served in the United States Army during the World War.

Mr. Angelot is alleged to have stated that this organization throughout the United States is devoting its efforts to combatting the Fascist agitation of the Italian World War Veterans, the members of which served in the Italian Army during the World War.

It is alleged that both the Italian-American World War Veterans of the United States, Incorporated, and the Italian World War Veterans have strong units in Youngstown, Ohio. Angelot is reported by the informant to have stated that his organization is cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The files of the Bureau fail to reflect the name of Girard Angelot as a confidential informant and it is believed desirable to contact Angelot with a view of enlisting his services as a confidential informant concerning Italian activities in the vicinity of Youngstown, Ohio.

You are therefore requested to interview Girard Angelot appropriately after preliminary investigation has been made of his activities by your Office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

[redacted]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EAT:AI

January 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Committee considered the question whether the Bureau should attempt to obtain the fingerprints of all of the National Defense informants. You will recall that we are making a check by names of both the Investigative files and the Identification Division files of all persons before they are approved as informants. The possibility exists, however, that a person might have a criminal record in the Identification Division under a name other than the name known to us.

The National Defense Committee recommends against any attempt to secure the fingerprints of all National Defense informants. It is pointed out that some 6,000 to 7,000 of these informants have been contacted and arrangements made for them to furnish information to the Bureau. It is believed that if we now attempted to fingerprint these individuals, many of them would be unwilling to further cooperate with us, believing that the Bureau was taking advantage of their willingness to cooperate. It is further pointed out that neighborhood investigation, check of the credit records, and of the local police department is made with reference to each applicant.

With the initiation of the American Legion project as a source of informants, we would, of course, be presented with the problem of fingerprinting all of the members of the American Legion who are utilized, and here again we might meet some very positive opposition.

For these reasons, the Committee recommends against any attempt to fingerprint our confidential sources of information.

RECORDED & INDEXED
Respectfully,

E. A. Tamm

ENCL 5

Agree

RB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

66-[illegible]-7
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
6 JAN 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM
CHF. CLK.
FIVE

RECORDED COPY FILED IN: 32-[illegible]-20

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

RJB:WKB

January 13, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Clavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

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DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/MC/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: National Defense Informants - General.

In the handling of correspondence from the Field concerning confidential informants who are presently being used by the field offices, the writer in addition to having a check made of the file indices has been routing the correspondence to the Identification Division for appropriate check against the name indices to ascertain if the individuals have previous criminal records.

Bureau Bulletin Number One, First Series, 1941, Page 7, advised the Field that any person who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes, should not be considered or developed as an informant and that if any person with a criminal record including felonies was being considered as an informant, his relation with the Bureau in that capacity should be terminated immediately and the Bureau advised.

Since the Bureau does not desire to use the services of informants who have in the past been convicted of felony violations, it is not believed that a search of the name indices in the Identification Division is sufficient to determine that the individual does not have a criminal record including felony convictions. It is entirely possible that informants who are presently being used by the Bureau have been arrested for felonies having been convicted under some other name and the criminal records would not be located through a search of the name indices.

RECORDED 66-2542-3-7

It is, therefore, suggested that the Bureau consider having each informant who is used on a regular basis or who is [illegible] services, submit his fingerprints to the Bureau on a personal identification card so that an appropriate search may be made through the Identification Division Fingerprint Files. It is realized that some difficulty may be encountered in the Field with those individuals who object to submitting their fingerprints but who it is believed might be in a position to supply information of value and if in the future an occasion arises when the Bureau feels that the services of an informant

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
6 JAN 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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PERS. FILES

are so valuable that his cooperation should not be jeopardized by requesting his fingerprints, an exception could be made to the general rule. It is also believed, however, that any informant who desires to work for the Bureau as a confidential informant and who is being paid for his services, should have no hesitation in furnishing his fingerprints for a search through the criminal files. If he does object to such procedure, there would be all the more reason to suspect that he has in the past been convicted of a crime which would preclude his employment as a confidential informant.

Respectfully,

R. J. Brandt

R. J. Brandt.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF 10/6/8 DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CODE (U)

74385

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. KRM:bc 1-30-41 (U)

Transmit the following message to: ALL FIELD OFFICES - EXCEPT WASHINGTON, D. C.

RE COMMUNIST PARTY. RENEWED AND CONTINUOUS EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO DEVELOP INFORMANTS TO COVER ALL ACTIVITIES OF COMMUNIST PARTY IN ALL FIELDS OF ACTIVITY. BUREAU MUST BE CURRENTLY AND PROMPTLY ADVISED OF ALL PLANS, ACTIVITIES, AIMS, AND PURPOSES OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND ALL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER ITS ORGANIZATION OR SUBJECT TO ITS PENETRATION. CONSTANT EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN ALL LITERATURE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS NAMED IN BUREAU TELETYPE OF DECEMBER SEVENTEETH LAST AND SUCH OTHER GROUPS AS MAY BE ORGANIZED AND PENETRATED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN FUTURE.

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HOOVER

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 Pmd/mc/JCO
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.3.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-81
7-10-81

CC WASHINGTON, D. C. - By Messenger

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-10-81 BY 2842 Pmd/mc/JCO~~

2-8-43 83-1343
ENCLOSED BY 1042 DNA/S
PACKAGE NO. CHER

RECORDED 66-1042-3-28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEB 4 1941 (U)
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED AUTHORIZED BY SAC
DATE 6-8-94

83-1343

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy
CARSON

HHC:JB November 4, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

There is attached hereto a list of informants by field offices as reported by the field offices as of October 25, 1940.

The total number of informants in each office, as shown in the extreme right-hand column does not in each instance (as indicated by the asterisk) add up to the total number of informants under each nationalistic group due to the fact that there is some overlapping. This number, however, does reflect the actual number of informants reported by the field office. The total number of informants under each classification also is shown.

Letters will be prepared to each office, where the facts justify, pointing out the need for increased activity and an increased number of informants in each category.

Respectfully,

H. H. Clegg

Enclosure

cc E. A. Tamm

1-27-41 a more recent report is being requested of Field

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DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 DMV/mc/JC

RECORDED & INDEXED

1 ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 JAN 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOLSON FIVE CHECK CLK

Mel-24-41

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Types of Un-American Activities Reported

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 10498PKW/SJ
ON 2/10/81

Office	German	Italian	Communist	Other Nationalities	General Un-American	Within Plants & Industry	Total number of Informants in District
Albany	5	1	0	0	1	1	8
Atlanta	18	0	6	0	0	3	27
Baltimore	2	1	2	0	5	71	81
Birmingham	30	8	20	9	22	65	154
Boston	10	24	7	0	35	30	106
Buffalo	4	1	3	1	4	77	90
Butte	2	1	8	1	5	0	17
Charlotte	0	0	3	0	1	19	23
Chicago	7	1	4	1	0	0	13
Cincinnati	8	0	5	0	12	39	64
Cleveland	10	11	11	8	95	51	186
Dallas	6	1	1	0	0	13	21
Denver	1	3	4	1	2	3	14
Des Moines	31	2	4	6	9	4	56
Detroit	18	17	22	6	10	94	167
El Paso	10	2	2	1	12	4	31
Grand Rapids	8	5	14	3	13	2	21 *
Honolulu	36	3	20	61	41	45	206
Houston	0	0	0	0	0	18	18
Huntington	9	0	11	0	0	4	16 *
Indianapolis	2	0	4	0	1	72	79
Juneau	1	0	3	0	24	3	31
Kansas City	12	3	9	0	2	0	26
Knoxville	1	0	3	0	2	74	80
Little Rock	3	0	4	0	4	0	9 *
Los Angeles	26	9	14	21	14	86	170
Louisville	7	2	3	0	1	10	20 *
Memphis	3	0	1	0	5	1	8 *
Miami	5	1	4	1	10	0	21
Milwaukee	19	2	6	1	18	35	72 *
Newark	15	10	3	0	27	52	107
New Haven	2	1	1	0	2	194	200
New Orleans	4	2	1	0	2	4	13
New York	23	8	14	8	39	58	130 *
Oklahoma	28	0	9	0	1	38	76
Omaha	6	1	6	2	2	2	17 *
Philadelphia	17	8	12	3	12	19	[illegible]
Phoenix	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	21	19	0	51 *

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXTENDED [illegible] EXTENSION 2
REASON [illegible]
FCIM, II, 1-[illegible]
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91
9-15-81

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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcl

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(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Office	German	Italian	Communist	Other Nationalities	General Un-American	Within Plants & Industry	Total number of Informants in District
Pittsburgh	5	5	6	3	23	16	58
Portland	6	0	5	2	13	2	28
Richmond	3	0	2	0	8	18	31
St. Louis	13	8	6	4	4	21	56
St. Paul	7	4	6	2	2	79	100
Salt Lake City	14	1	7	3	36	27	88
San Antonio	7	1	1	5	2	0	11 *
San Diego	7	4	8	9	15	22	65
San Francisco	15	6	36	7	46	12	122
San Juan	11	2	2	11	41	45	104 *
Savannah	32	2	4	0	99	25	162
Seattle	25	10	20	8	8	23	94
Sioux Falls	187	2	56	0	14	2	261
Springfield	22	12	25	8	5	145	217
Washington	2	0	1	1	0	0	4
TOTAL	762	190	446	218	768	1620	3873

(U)

* This figure represents the actual number of individuals acting as informants in the district. It varies from the arithmetical total of the preceeding six columns by reason of the fact that some individuals act as informants concerning more than one type of activity and have therefore been listed in more than one of the preceeding columns in order that an accurate picture of the number of informants in each group may be shown. (U)

The total of column 7 indicates the exact number of persons acting as confidential informants in all field divisions. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

21092

CINCINNATI, OHIO

BLD:KW
98-7

January 29-1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: AXEL EHLERT alias Axel Ahlert
SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

This is to advise that the confidential informant referred to as [redacted] in the report of Special Agent B. L. DAMRON, Cincinnati, Ohio dated January 29, 1941 is [redacted] Cincinnati, Ohio.

b6
b7C
b7D

Very truly yours,

R. C. SURAN
Special Agent in Charge

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DATE 7-10-81 BY 28422 mc/mc/JC

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Re-indexed
this serial only.
10/27/58 39

RECORDED
& INDEXED

11 25 42-3 10

3 JAN 31 1941

FIVE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 1/24 1941

TO:

____Director
____Mr. Coffey
____Mr. Egan
____Mr. Foxworth
____Miss Gandy
____Mr. Glavin
____Mr. Harbo
____Mr. Hendon
____Mr. Kleinkauf
✓ ~~Mr. Ladd~~
____Mr. R. H. Laughlin
____Mr. Nichols
____Mr. Pennington
____Mr. Renneberger
____Mr. Rosen
____Mr. E. A. Tamm
____Mr. Quinn Tamm
____Mr. Tracy
____Mr. Tolson

____Chief Clerk's Office
____Files Section
____Ident. Division
____Mail Room
____Mechanical Section
____Personnel Files Section
____Supply Division
____Tour Room
____Washington Field

____Mr. Carey
____Mr. Donaldson
____Mr. Hince
____Mr. Hicks
____Mr. F. T. McIntyre
____Mr. H. A. Meyers
____Mr. Morley
____Mr. Muzzey
____Mr. T. E. Myers
____Mr. Robey

____Mr. _____

____Miss Biles
____Mrs. Rice
____Miss Hodges, 5254
____Miss Heath, 4258
____Mrs. Griggs, 5256
____Miss Teller, 4258
____Miss Turner, 5243
____Mr. Slattery, Quantico
____See me
____Phone me
____Send file - up to date
____Note and return
____Record and route
____Please handle
____Please forward

Re suggestions concerning Lab & Radio work -

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DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 DMW/mc JC

H. H. Clegg - Rm. 5256
Telephone 39

JB:KKB

21091

66-2542-3-11

February 4, 1941

Special Agent in Charge
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 Pmd/
mc/JC

Dear Sir:

The Bureau is in receipt of your letter dated January 4, 1941 wherein you made reference to certain observations which were made by Mr. Jack L. Mackey, Chief Clerk of the Oklahoma City Office, who recently attended a Clerical School at Washington, D. C. The following comments are being set out in reply to the specific inquiries made in your letter:

1. Advice was requested as to whether the Bureau desires to have a "no case" file opened on each person who writes the Bureau or the field office offering his services as an informant or source of information. It is Mr. Mackey's understanding that the Bureau desires to have such files opened under a "66" classification.

It is believed that this correspondence should be filed in a "66" general file. If it is necessary for an Agent to interview an individual who corresponds with the field office, it is believed preferable to open a separate case file under the "66" classification so this particular matter can be shown as pending on the monthly administrative report, but when a transaction is completed by an interview at the office or by acknowledgment of a letter, it is believed that the correspondence should be filed in the "66" general file.

2. Advice was also requested as to whether the Bureau desires to have separate "62" cases opened on matters received from ONI and MID.

This inquiry is not clearly understood by the Bureau; however, it would appear to be undesirable to open "62" cases on matters received from those agencies. If the information pertains to espionage, for example, it should be opened under a "65" classification while if it pertains to an internal security matter, a case should be opened under a "100" classification. It is believed that all types of information

FEB 5 9 35 AM '41
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
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DEPT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

FEB 5 1941
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

RJB:WKB

January 13, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

With reference to the letter from the Oklahoma City office dated January 4, 1941 concerning the observations made by Mr. Jack L. Mackey, Chief Clerk of the Oklahoma City office who recently attended a Clerical School at Washington, D. C., the writer has interviewed Messrs. Patterson and Waikart of the Files Section and Mrs. Pumphrey who according to Mr. Waikart handles most of the matters referred to in the letter. Mr. Tracy was also in Mr. Patterson's office during the discussion and suggested that the writer prepare a memorandum for transmittal to the Training Division.

The specific inquiries made by Mr. Andersen are set out as follows:

1. Advice was requested as to whether the Bureau desires to have a "no case" file opened on each person who writes the Bureau or the field office offering his services as an informant or source of information. It is Mr. Mackey's understanding that the Bureau desires to have such files opened under a "66" classification.

Mr. Patterson stated that he cannot recall discussing this particular matter before the Clerical School.

Mrs. Pumphrey is of the opinion that Mr. Mackey has failed to make a distinction between confidential informants, sources of information, and persons who have offered their services to the Bureau merely as a cooperative gesture; for example, the president of a bank who directs a letter to the field office stating that he would be glad to be of assistance in the present emergency.

I ENCL. FM

After discussing this matter with the above named individuals, the writer suggests that a "66" general file be opened and that all correspondence or memoranda concerning interviews with persons who

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THREE
CHF. CLERK

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

are desirous of assisting the Bureau but are not to be used specifically as confidential informants, be filed in this one general "66" file rather than opening a separate "66" file for each of these letters. It is also suggested that if the field office desires to maintain a complete record of those individuals who have offered to cooperate with that office but are not being regularly used as informants or sources of information or contacts, that they could do so by maintaining a cross index card entitled "Offer of Service" or some similar caption and the names of the individuals who have written letters to the Bureau or the field office could then be listed on this card with the file reference.

It is not believed necessary to open a separate file for each confidential informant or source of information who communicates with the field office unless it is necessary for an Agent to interview that individual and in that case it is recommended that a separate file be opened so that it can be shown in a pending status on the administrative report. When the transaction is completed by an interview at the office or by the acknowledgment of a letter by the field office, it is believed that correspondence from an informant or source of information should then be filed in a general file considering the fact that an index card will be maintained on the individual in the informant or source of information index box.

It is believed desirable to open a separate file on those confidential informants who are regularly furnishing reports to a field office particularly those informants who are being paid for their services. If a separate file is opened on these individuals it will be possible for the Special Agent in Charge in connection with the supervision of that individual's activities to review the file to ascertain the advisability of continuing payments to that particular informant.

2. Mr. Andersen requested advice as to whether the Bureau desired to have separate "62" cases opened on matters received from ONI and MID.

This inquiry is not understood. However, it is not believed that separate "62" cases should be opened on matters received generally from ONI and MID particularly if they pertain to separate violations or suspects. In this connection it would appear that if ONI or MID furnishes information concerning a possible Espionage suspect a "65"

file should be opened, whereas, if it appears that the individual is one who should be considered for temporary custodial detention pending investigation a "100" file should be opened. It is also possible that a representative of ONI or MID could furnish information concerning a NMVTA violation and in this case it would of course be proper to open a "26" file. It is believed, however, that the question is too indefinite for a definite answer to be given to Mr. Andersen and it is believed that he should be requested to amplify his question.

3. Advice was also requested as to whether a separate confidential informant file should be opened as to each type of violation where necessary as well as a similar file with reference to sources of information.

It is believed that this would depend entirely upon the particular case. For example, if there is a "26" case pending in the office and information is received from an individual who desires his identity to be kept secret, it would appear proper for the information to be filed in the file which pertains to that particular violation. If information was desired concerning the identity of confidential informants who, for example, are used in connection with "26" or "31" cases, it is suggested that this could be handled properly by cross indexing the names of informants on cards indicating that they would supply information concerning NMVTA or WSTA violations. However, unless an informant is used generally and repeatedly this, apparently, would serve no purpose. There would appear to be no reason for a separate confidential informant file to be opened as to each type of violation since the names of the individuals would be properly indexed in the confidential informant box which is maintained by the Special Agent in Charge.

4. Advice was also requested as to whether the names of all informants in National Defense cases should be indexed.

It is believed that it is proper to index all of these names.

Respectfully,

R. J. Brandt

R. J. Brandt

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

January 22, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

RJB:AA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Reference is made to the letter from the Oklahoma City Office dated January 4, 1941, concerning the observations made by Mr. Jack L. Mackey, Chief Clerk of the Oklahoma City Office who recently attended a Clerical School at Washington, D. C. The writer has interviewed Messrs. Patterson and Waikart of the Files Section and Mrs. Pumphrey who according to Mr. Waikart handles most of the matters referred to in the letter.

The specific inquiries made by Mr. Andersen are set out as follows:

1. Advice was requested as to whether the Bureau desires to have a "no case" file opened on each person who writes the Bureau or the field office offering his services as an informant or source of information. It is Mr. Mackey's understanding that the Bureau desires to have such files opened under a "66" classification.

It is believed that this correspondence should be filed in a "66" general file. If it is necessary for an Agent to interview an individual who corresponds with the field office, it is believed that a separate case file should be opened under a "66" classification so that this particular matter can be shown as pending on the monthly administrative report, but when the transaction is completed by an interview at the office or by acknowledgment of the letter, it is believed that that correspondence should be filed in the "66" general file.

2. Mr. Andersen requested advice as to whether the Bureau desired to have separate "62" cases opened on matters received from ONI and MID.

RECORDED 66-2542-3-11

This inquiry is not understood. However, it would appear that it is undesirable to open "62" cases on matters received from

4 FEB 13 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TAMM THREE CHF. CLK.

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R 582 JUL 10 1941

Letter to Okla. City Off.
2/4/41 R.J.B.(o)

those agencies. If the information pertains to espionage, for instance, it should be opened under a "65" classification, or if it pertains to an internal security matter, it should be opened under a "100" classification. It is believed that all types of information which are furnished by ONI and G-2 can be readily classified into the existing classifications depending upon the character of that particular information.

3. Advice was also requested as to whether a separate confidential informant file should be opened as to each type of violation where necessary as well as a similar file with reference to sources of information.

It is not believed that this practice is necessary or advisable.

4. Advice was also requested as to whether the names of all informants in national defense cases should be indexed.

It is believed that it is proper to index all of these names.

Respectfully,

R. J. Brandt

R. J. Brandt

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
JANUARY 4, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Mr. Jack L. Mackey attended the Chief Clerk's School in Washington recently and returned with certain observations.

For instance, he stated it is his understanding the Bureau desires to have a "no case" file opened on each person who either writes the Bureau or this office direct offering his services as an informant or source of information. It is Mr. Mackey's understanding that the Bureau desires to have such files opened under a "66" classification. The Bureau's advice as to the proper procedure will be appreciated.

He also observed the Bureau desires to have separate "62" cases opened on matters received from the O.N.I. and M.I.D. Is this the procedure desired by the Bureau?

He also understands that the Bureau desires to have a separate Confidential Informant file opened as to each type of violation, where necessary, as well as a similar file with reference to Sources of Information. The Bureau's advice will be appreciated.

During the last conference here a discussion arose as to whether it would be advisable to index the names of all informants in National Defense cases.

The Bureau's answers to these questions will be greatly appreciated.

RECORDED
Very truly yours,
H. E. Andersen
H. E. ANDERSEN
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

66-2542-3-11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842pmd /mc/ JC

HEA:os

THREE

Memo to Mr. Tamm Letter to O.C. Office
1/22/41 R.J.B. 2/9/41 R.J.B.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

DML:mm

May 1, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

W. B. McLaughlin, Special Agent, was interviewed on May 1, 1941 at which time he stated that he would like to make a suggestion for the consideration of the National Defense Division. He stated that he desired to suggest that there be considered in connection with the larger Bureau offices the establishment of one man to supervise the development of confidential informants and to maintain the index cards and contacts with these various informants; that they should be subdivided as to cities and neighborhoods, as well as hotels, apartments, etc. He stated that he felt this was necessary in order to develop adequately and maintain confidential informants.

McLaughlin also suggested that twice as much time be allotted to that portion of the Retraining School dealing with the wrapping of evidence and sound work and the lock study; that at the present time only one hour was available for each of these matters and that he believed it was probably the best part of the Retraining session and the most helpful.

He also suggested with reference to the training in the use of the FM radio that the surveillance problem be worked out whereby two or three of the radio cars check up a surveillance on a fourth car and endeavor to cover it over a section of highway.

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OTHERWISE

Respectfully,

D. M. Ladd

CONFIDENTIAL

6/14/41
Let to McLaughlin
D. M. M.

RECORDED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 MAY 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-81

IN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

FCH:HMW May 15, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Candy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

Reference is made to a memorandum for the Director of Mr. D. M. Ladd, under date of May 1, 1941, reflecting the suggestion of Special Agent W. B. McLaughlin to the effect that the larger field offices be authorized to appoint one Special Agent to exclusively supervise the development of confidential informants and the maintenance of index cards and contacts with their informants, also that the index cards should be subdivided as to cities and neighborhoods, as well as hotels, etc.

This appears to be a matter which should be considered by each Special Agent in Charge and it is not felt that the Bureau should offer such a suggestion to the field, but that such action should be taken on the initiative of each Special Agent in Charge to adequately handle this program. It is believed that the Bureau bulletin which is presently being printed regarding confidential informants adequately covers the matter of filing index cards.

A letter is not being addressed to Special Agent McLaughlin, in view of the fact that he also makes suggestions in regard to the training school.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

F. C. Holloman

RECORDED

INDEXED

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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMU
MC/JC

66-2542-3-12X
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 MAY 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH CLEGG LADD

CONF. INFT. in Genl. Intel. Matters - genl.

CH-19

(Harrison)
13 Harrison St.
Elmira, N.Y.
(#19.7)

Personel Head
F.B.I.
Washington, D.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

Dear Sir;

This is no doubt the hardest letter I ever attempted to write and at the the same time try to kill a bit of "silly" feeling — so I deviate from form, punctuation etc.

This town is doing a lot of gov't work — which more or less prompts this letter.

I work as a bill collectors and am in a position to be "any place"

I am of normal intelligence (high school — 1 yr college) but have a curious nature. To get to the point; a number of things and people (that I have seen and met) look "fishy" to me.

RECORDED & INDEXED 66-2542-3-13
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
4 FEB 6 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The crux of this note is that I don't know what to do about it. (Every bit surmising is to myself only)

Conf Sgt in Gen Intell Matters Gen.

52441A

I have no idea how to go about getting concrete evidence th

What I would like would be to continue with my present work and receive instruction about "these other things."

I have no romantic dreams about being a G man.
I have a patriotic feeling and think I should do something besides collect bills.

Please excuse the unorthodox form but please understand it would be much easier to talk than write.

Dial 7837

E. C. Thomas
E L THOMAS

[redacted] Bureau of Investiga[redacted]

United States Department of Justice

Seattle, Washington
February 5, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: Confidential Informant

2-196

Dear Sir:

[redacted]

This is to advise the Bureau that [redacted] North, business address [redacted] Seattle, Washington, has been given confidential number [redacted] of this office.

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b7D

It is contemplated that in the future [redacted] will be able to furnish the Seattle Field Office with confidential information relative to the activities of various Japanese in this community by virtue of his being the manager of the International Branch, Seattle-First National Bank, Seattle, Washington, which is located in the Japanese section of Seattle and the majority of its business is carried on among the Japanese of Seattle and the Pacific Northwest.

Very truly yours,

A. Cornelius

A. CORNELIUS, JR.
Special Agent in Charge

AJZ:MA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 DMD/MC/JC

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

66-2572-3-14

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 FEB 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FIVE

CHF. CLERK

JJS:BR
66-2542-3-13

RECORDED

February 21, 1941

Mr. E. C. Thomas
113 Harrison Street
Elmira, New York

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Your letter postmarked February 4, 1941, has been received, and I was pleased indeed to learn of your desire to be of assistance during the present emergency. I am enclosing one of our pamphlets which will furnish you information regarding the various violations of Federal laws over which this Bureau has jurisdiction.

As you know, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has also been charged with the duty of investigating all violations of the espionage, sabotage or related laws. The actual investigations of such matters are handled by the trained personnel of this Bureau in cooperation with duly constituted law enforcement agencies. It will be appreciated, however, if you will furnish any information which might come to your attention indicating a possible violation of such laws immediately to Mr. H. T. O'Connor, Special Agent in Charge of our Office located at 400 U. S. Court House Building, Buffalo, New York.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CC - Buffalo

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Landon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Ray
Mr. Andy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Enclosure
FEB 21 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

42

OHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EAT:DS February 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

I discussed in general terms at the Executive Conference the problem of formulating some immediate practical steps of increasing the Bureau's informants within the Communist Party, Bund and other organizations for the purpose of obtaining the views of the conference members on the Special Agents in Charge who might be called to Washington for a one-day conference to outline the most practical program possible. The following names have been recommended and if you approve, there is attached hereto a teletype instructing these men to be in Washington for a one-day conference on Saturday, February 8th:

Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Connelley
Mr. Conroy
Mr. McKee
Mr. Brantley
Mr. Devereaux
Mr. T. J. Donegan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMW/mc/JO

Respectfully,

Edward A. Tamm

Read to Director and approved by him. 8:57 P.M. 2-5-41 Jack.

RECORDED
INDEXED

66-2542-31-15
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 FEB 7 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM
NICHOLS
FIVE
CHF. CLK.

March 31, 1941

RJB:KLB

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED 66-2542-3-14

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 pm/jmc/JO
ON 7-10-81

Special Agent in Charge
Seattle, Washington

Re: [redacted]
Confidential Informant.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated February 5, 1941, wherein you advised that the above named individual who resides at [redacted] Seattle, Washington, and is [redacted] Seattle, Washington, has been designated as a confidential informant and will furnish information concerning the activities of Japanese individuals residing in the vicinity of his place of business.

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For your information I am enclosing herewith two photostatic copies of the following investigative reports which were submitted in connection with the case entitled, [redacted] Pro-German Matter."

Reports of Special Agent Petrovitsky dated at Seattle, Washington on April 2, April 5, April 8 and April 23, 1917. Report of Special Employee Terry dated at Seattle, Washington on December 29, 1917. Page 2 of a report which was submitted by Special Employee Terry dated at Seattle, Washington on February 4, 1918. The first page of this report apparently pertained to a different matter and is not available in the Bureau files.

It will be noted that the subject of that investigation was at that time employed as a clerk at the Seattle National Bank of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, and during the World War had a brother who was a Captain in the German Army.

I am also enclosing herewith two photostatic copies of the following correspondence which was submitted in connection with the case entitled, [redacted]

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b7D

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
MAR 31 1941
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

[redacted] Seattle, Washington, Alleged Violation Harrison Narcotic Act."

Personal and confidential letter dated March 17, 1922, directed to the Bureau by Mr. R. A. Darling, Acting Special Agent in Charge.

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Reports of Special Agent L. S. Read dated at Seattle, Washington on April 13, 1922, June 28, 1922, October 25, 1922, and November 24, 1922.

From the information contained in the above mentioned communications, it would appear that the subject of those investigations is probably identical with the individual who has been designated as a confidential informant.

Since there was some question as to [redacted] loyalty during the last war, he should not be designated as a confidential informant. It will, of course, be satisfactory for your Office to accept any information which may be offered by [redacted] on a purely voluntary basis. The symbol which you have submitted for [redacted] is being cancelled in the Bureau file and your records should be corrected accordingly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosures

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class. FR DATE

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
OMAHA, NEBRASKA
February 4, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY SP6 Eja/Eja
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

Re: [redacted]
Confidential Informant
INTERNAL SECURITY - R.

Dear Sir:

The above captioned individual is being used as a confidential informant by this office. The following is information concerning him:

Designation - [redacted] No Record

Name - [redacted] No record

Address - [redacted] Omaha, Nebraska.

Type of information expected - Communistic activities in the Russian Progressive Club, Omaha.

Services - Continuous.

Amount of compensation to be paid - Only actual expense in connection with joining the above mentioned club; initial expense probably $5 with small amounts for dues and social affairs from time to time.

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b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

This man was recommended by WILLIAM J. REYNOLDS, 3128 North 49th Street, Omaha, REYNOLDS being very active in the South Omaha Post of the American Legion. He advised that [redacted] was entirely reliable and could be depended upon to co-operate 100 percent.

GEORGE GILLAN, Adjutant of Omaha Post No. 1, American Legion, also stated that he knew [redacted] well, and he considered him to be entirely reliable.

RECORDED & INDEXED

[redacted] is a member of the American Legion, is very active in the South Omaha Post, and has indicated complete willingness to co-operate with the Bureau.

2 FEB 7 1941

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 AMD/MCLJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

Very truly yours,

C. W. STEIN,
Special Agent in Charge

LJM/GMZ

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. [February 4, 1941] (U)

Transmit the following message to; ALL SAC'S EXCEPT WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CODED (U)

SABOTAGE. THE BUREAU IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING REPORTED ACTS OF SABOTAGE ARE BEING HANDLED. EACH SAC IS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIVE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THESE CASES. THE BUREAU IS WELL AWARE OF THE INVOLVED NATURE OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS BUT BELIEVES THAT BY INGENUITY AND CONCERTED, INTELLIGENT INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT, SOLUTIONS MAY BE REACHED. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN THIS REGARD CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. EACH BUREAU EMPLOYEE SHOULD BE CONSTANTLY ON THE ALERT FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE IDENTITY, WHEREABOUTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN INSPIRED INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS WHO MAY BE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL SABOTEURS. THE BUREAU CONSIDERS THE SOLUTION OF SABOTAGE CASES TO BE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

HOOVER

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY SLIP(S) OF MEETING DATE 10-6-88

CC - Washington (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 Pmd/mcl
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.42 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

RECORDED & INDEXED

per 66-2542-3-17

2-8-93
Classified by 1048 DKM/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

RJB:WKB

January 27, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

It is presently the practice for the field offices to submit semimonthly reports on the 5th and 20th of each month listing the total number of plant informants developed in each industrial plant appearing on the priority lists furnished to the Bureau by the War and Navy Departments. These reports when they are received from the field offices are tabulated in schedule form in Mr. Holloman's Unit and a memorandum is then submitted to the Director showing the number of sources of information and plant informants employed in each of the plants appearing on the priority lists.

The field has not been submitting data on national defense informants generally and it is believed that in the future this information should also be received periodically from the field so that the Bureau can be kept advised as to the progress that is being made in connection with that project.

It is noted that a letter was directed to the field on September 23, 1940 requesting each of the field offices to submit a report showing the total number of informants developed by that office under various captions including plant informants and the information obtained as a result of that specific request was tabulated in a memorandum for the Director. However, the field offices have not submitted information concerning national defense informants generally since November, 1940. It is believed that the report concerning general informants should also be submitted on the 5th and 20th of each month so that the progress in the field can be noted.

Attached hereto is a suggested form letter for transmittal to each of the field offices.

RECORDED
Respectfully,
R. J. Brandt
R. J. Brandt

66-2542-3-18
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 FEB 6 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOLSON TAMM FIVE

66-2542-2-34
66-2330-21
66-9000-30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
5-20-81 2842pmd MacEm

ALLOTTED COPY FILED IN

RJB:jc

February 8, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/ mc/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

At approximately 11:10 A. M. on February 6, 1941, Special Agent in Charge Kitchin of the Dallas Office, while calling the Bureau on another matter, conversed with the writer concerning the letter which was directed to all Field Offices instructing them to submit separate reports to the Bureau on the fifth and twentieth of each month, reporting the number of various types of informants developed by those offices exclusive of plant informants and American Legion contacts.

Mr. Kitchin stated that the letter from the Bureau was very clear, but that some confusion has arisen in his mind as to the distinction between confidential informants (National Defense Informants-General), plant informants and American Legion contacts.

He stated he understands that persons contacted in connection with the American Legion program are to be considered as sources of information until they have been developed into regular confidential informants, and could be logically considered as such. He also understands that information concerning the development of plant informants is to be submitted to the Bureau in a supplemental report, listing the names of the industrial facilities in his Division and the number of informants developed in each plant.

He stated that his problem, however, was that if he listed all of his plant informants in that report and did not include his American Legion contacts, he would have nothing to report in the way of general informants. Mr. Kitchin pointed out that there is not, of course, as much subversive activity in the Dallas area as could be expected in other Divisions, such as New York, Detroit, Pittsburgh or the West Coast offices, and stated that since there is very little information of this character to report, consequently informants have very little occasion to furnish information to the Dallas Office.

RECORDED 66-2542-3-19

It was pointed out to Mr. Kitchin that each Field Office, irrespective of its size, should have a reasonable number of informants reporting information to that office concerning the activities of the various nationalistic groups, including German, Japanese,

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-2-7

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

TAMM
HENDON
CHF. CLK.

Communist, Italian and other American groups who would not come within those classifications. It was pointed out to him that if a man is originally contacted in connection with the American Legion program as a plant informant, but later develops into an informant concerning matters generally, he could then be classified as a general informant as well as a plant informant.

It was pointed out to him that an individual working in a plant, in addition to furnishing information concerning individuals employed in that plant, might possibly develop to the point where he could furnish considerable information concerning German organizations or other subversive groups operating entirely independent of the plant where he is employed. He was also advised that whenever individuals contacted in connection with the American Legion program are developed to the point where they are regularly reporting information to his office concerning subversive activities, they could then be given symbols and should be included in his report on regular confidential informants.

It was pointed out to Mr. Kitchin that the Bureau contemplates the development of some 15,000 American Legion contacts, and obviously a great many of these contacts should not be classified as confidential informants. He was also advised that discretion should be used in designating any individual as a regular confidential informant and assigning him a symbol, because the Bureau does not desire the names of sources of information and contacts submitted as confidential informants. If, however, he has for example a banker or some prominent business man who is cooperating regularly with his office and furnishing information of an unusual nature which he would not in the regular course of events be expected to furnish, it is satisfactory to give him a symbol and classify him as a regular informant.

It was suggested to Mr. Kitchin that if he does not have any regular informants at the present time furnishing information concerning various nationalistic groups, he should make every effort to develop this type of informant, since there is obviously some activity in his Division which should be brought to his attention through this type of informant.

Respectfully,

R. J. Brandt

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

March 1, 1941

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 9
First Series 1941

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

The following observations, suggestions and instructions are submitted:

(A) DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMANTS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE MATTERS. -- In the future when the names and symbols of confidential informants are submitted to the Bureau, the Field Office should clearly indicate whether those informants are to be used on general criminal matters exclusively or in connection with national defense matters.

When Field Offices desire to submit information concerning informants used only in connection with criminal investigations, this information should be transmitted to the Bureau by separate communications, and letters concerning national defense informants should not contain information concerning general informants who are used exclusively in connection with criminal work. This can be accomplished by using the captions, "National Defense Informants - General," "Confidential Informants - General" and "Plant Informants."

Each communication should relate specifically to only one of the three different types of informants. Each Field Office is also requested to advise the Bureau of the identity of those informants designated by symbols who are being used exclusively in connection with criminal investigations not involving national defense matters.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

NOT RECORDED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 MAR 7 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

(D) DEVELOPING SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND CONTACTS. -- Certain suggestions have been made to the Washington Headquarters of the Bureau with respect to the desirability and necessity of developing more contacts and sources of information in connection with our work. Many of these suggestions have considerable merit and they are being forwarded to you at this time in order that you may take appropriate action to place them into effect in your field division.

It has been indicated that particularly in connection with the national defense situation and the responsibilities of the Bureau at the present time, it would be helpful if we were able to develop proper sources of information and contacts in hotels, apartment houses, rental agencies, restaurants, and similar places in which persons meet and congregate. I am sure you can appreciate the various situations pertaining to these sources of information which might be of value in our work, particularly so in view of the fact that sources of information in such capacities might be able to furnish information of value with respect to persons possibly engaged in activities inimical to the best interests of the country. The same situation applies to proper informants and contacts among taxicab drivers and operators.

Another suggestion which appears to possess considerable merit is that there be recorded in each field division as sources of information, friends or associates of individual Special Agents, who, because of the nature of their employment, might be in a position to furnish valuable information in the present emergency. For example, persons associated with or employed in the banking business, the brokerage business, and in other types of business having a general contact with the public, might well be informed by Special Agents who are related to or associated with them, of the types of information which the Bureau is desirous of securing at this time.

It is possible that individual Special Agents may possess such available sources of information in their hometowns, or in other parts of the country than that to which they are presently assigned. In such instances, appropriate information should be forwarded to the field division in which such persons reside, so that Special Agents may call upon the persons designated, and identify themselves as Special Agents of the Bureau calling at the suggestion of the individual Agent who submitted the names of the potential sources of information and assistance. The Bureau's jurisdiction and program in the national defense operations should be explained to such potential sources of information, and their cooperation and aid invited in bringing to the Bureau's attention matters which may be of interest.

In connection with the establishment and maintenance of informants and contacts in various lines of business endeavor, your attention is called to the possibility of utilizing the Bureau's present program of collaboration with the American Legion to assist in this type of work. In some cities, American Legion Posts are organized within the hotel groups, taxicab driver organizations, and other similar groups. Consequently, it has been suggested that it may be practical, in some instances, to utilize the American Legion source as a basis for the establishment of confidential informants and contacts within these groups.

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(E) PLANT SURVEY. -- The attention of the Bureau has been directed to an existing hazard involving manufacturing plants handling defense contracts. Certain of these plants, it is pointed out, are so located that they are adjacent to or near large stores of commercial gasoline; furthermore, other manufacturing plants are located on navigable waterways through which pass large shipments of commercial gasoline in barges. It is pointed out that the presence of the gasoline in each instance cited constitutes a particular hazard in that burning gasoline floating on water may drift into the plants, starting fires.

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It is felt that such instances constitute individual problems which should be considered when they occur and your attention is drawn to the possible hazard for consideration in plant survey work.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66 57

NOT RECORDED

(G) PLANT SURVEY. -- In Bureau Bulletin No. 62, dated December 7, 1940, you were advised that the Bureau would make available upon request to the officials of industrial plants appearing on the priority list fingerprint cards and penalty envelopes.

The fingerprint cards to be furnished in accordance with the above-cited policy are the applicant cards. At the present time fingerprints of plant employees are being received on the Bureau's personal identification forms, Civil Service forms and miscellaneous commercial forms, as well as on the appropriate form provided for this purpose. Because of the additional work involved when incorrect fingerprint forms are used it will be necessary to return any fingerprint records received in the future from industrial concerns unless the finger impressions have been taken on the Bureau's applicant card or a similarly designed form.

February 4, 1941

RECORD 66-2542-3-18

SAC	ALBANY	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND
	ATLANTA	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	BALTIMORE	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BIRMINGHAM	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BOSTON	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BUFFALO	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUTTE	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	CHARLOTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SIOUX FALLS
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	SPRINGFIELD
				WASHINGTON, D. C.

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - GENERAL

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 23, 1940 concerning the development of informants who could serve the purpose of keeping the Bureau informed as to subversive movements and to inform more specifically with reference to general intelligence matters and national defense investigations. It will be noted that the letter requested information concerning the total number of informants developed by each field office under several different classifications.

The field offices are presently submitting semimonthly reports to the Bureau on the fifth and twentieth of each month showing the number of sources of information and confidential informants developed in each industrial plant which appears on the priority lists furnished by the War and Navy Departments. However, the report which is presently being submitted does not include information concerning national defense informants generally and in the future in addition to the report which is being submitted on plant informants, the Bureau desires a separate report on the fifth and twentieth of each month showing the number of confidential informants who are being regularly used by each field office in connection with national defense matters generally. This report should include the following information:

1. Number of informants regarding German or Nazi activities.
2. Number of informants regarding Italian or Fascist activities.
3. Number of informants regarding Communist activities.
4. Number of informants regarding Japanese activities.
5. Number of informants regarding activities of other nationalistic groups.
6. Number of informants regarding general un-American activities not falling within the first five groups.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ FEB 4 1941 ★
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7. Total number of informants developed by your field office who are capable of furnishing information on activities and matters pertaining to the national defense (this total will not include the number of plant informants since this information will be shown in the supplemental report which is submitted showing the number of plant informants employed in each industrial facility on the priority lists).

Your attention is directed to Bureau letter dated January 16, 1941 which is addressed to all Special Agents in Charge and was captioned "American Legion Contacts in National Defense Matters." Your specific attention is directed to paragraph one appearing on page two of that letter which indicates that those contacts should be designated as sources of information rather than confidential informants. Your American Legion contacts should, therefore, not be included in this report until they have assumed the full status of a confidential informant and are reporting regularly to your office concerning matters which pertain to the national defense generally.

If at any time in the future persons who have been contacted in connection with the American Legion program do develop to the point where they could logically be termed confidential informants, the Bureau should be furnished appropriate symbols for these individuals so that they can be identified in future communications.

Your attention is also directed to Bureau Bulletin No. 1, First Series, 1941 (F) dated January 2, 1941 and specifically to paragraph four appearing on page seven which is quoted as follows:

> "It is absolutely necessary and imperative that the confidential informants developed in regard to all National Defense work be honest, trustworthy, and reliable individuals. Great care should be taken in the selection of those persons who will be developed as informants. It is not desired that any person who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes be considered or developed by you as an informant. In the event any person with a criminal record including felonies is presently considered by you as an informant, his relation with the Bureau in the capacity of a confidential informant should be terminated immediately and the Bureau accordingly advised."

In this connection you are also requested to review your files concerning all informants who are presently being used in connection with national defense matters and if you have in the past designated any individual as a confidential informant in connection with this work who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes, you should immediately advise the Bureau so that his symbol can be cancelled and the Bureau's records corrected accordingly. This matter should receive your immediate attention.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

February 4, 1941

RECORDED 66-2542-3-18

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
NATHAN
LADD
TAMM, E. A.
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
GLAVIN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
NICHOLS
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - GENERAL

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 23, 1940 concerning the development of informants who could serve the purpose of keeping the Bureau informed as to subversive movements and to inform more specifically with reference to general intelligence matters and national defense investigations. It will be noted that the letter requested information concerning the total number of informants developed by each field office under several different classifications.

The field offices are presently submitting semimonthly reports to the Bureau on the fifth and twentieth of each month showing the number of sources of information and confidential informants developed in each industrial plant which appears on the priority lists furnished by the War and Navy Departments. However, the report which is presently being submitted does not include information concerning national defense informants generally and in the future in addition to the report which is being submitted on plant informants, the Bureau desires a separate report on the fifth and twentieth of each month showing the number of confidential informants who are being regularly used by each field office in connection with national defense matters generally. This report should include the following information:

1. Number of informants regarding German or Nazi activities.
2. Number of informants regarding Italian or Fascist activities.
3. Number of informants regarding Communist activities.
4. Number of informants regarding Japanese activities.
5. Number of informants regarding activities of other nationalistic groups.
6. Number of informants regarding general un-American activities not falling within the first five groups.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL ROOM
FEB 1 1941
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7. Total number of informants developed by your field office who are capable of furnishing information on activities and matters pertaining to the national defense (this total will not include the number of plant informants since this information will be shown in the supplemental report which is submitted showing the number of plant informants employed in each industrial facility on the priority lists).

Your attention is directed to Bureau letter dated January 16, 1941 which is addressed to all Special Agents in Charge and was captioned "American Legion Contacts in National Defense Matters." Your specific attention is directed to paragraph one appearing on page two of that letter which indicates that those contacts should be designated as sources of information rather than confidential informants. Your American Legion contacts should, therefore, not be included in this report until they have assumed the full status of a confidential informant and are reporting regularly to your office concerning matters which pertain to the national defense generally.

If at any time in the future persons who have been contacted in connection with the American Legion program do develop to the point where they could logically be termed confidential informants, the Bureau should be furnished appropriate symbols for these individuals so that they can be identified in future communications.

Your attention is also directed to Bureau Bulletin No. 1, First Series, 1941 (F) dated January 2, 1941 and specifically to paragraph four appearing on page seven which is quoted as follows:

> "It is absolutely necessary and imperative that the confidential informants developed in regard to all National Defense work be honest, trustworthy, and reliable individuals. Great care should be taken in the selection of those persons who will be developed as informants. It is not desired that any person who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes be considered or developed by you as an informant. In the event any person with a criminal record including felonies is presently considered by you as an informant, his relation with the Bureau in the capacity of a confidential informant should be terminated immediately and the Bureau accordingly advised."

In this connection you are also requested to review your files concerning all informants who are presently being used in connection with national defense matters and if you have in the past designated any individual as a confidential informant in connection with this work who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes, you should immediately advise the Bureau so that his symbol can be cancelled and the Bureau's records corrected accordingly. This matter should receive your immediate attention.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

E 21090

Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

RJB:jc

February 3, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 RMD/mc/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
NATIONAL DEFENSE - GENERAL

Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin No. 1, First Series 1941 (F), which advised the Field that no person who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes was to be considered or developed as an informant, and in the event any person with a criminal record including felonies was being considered by the Field as an informant, his relation with the Bureau in that capacity should be terminated immediately.

In this connection it is pointed out that under the present practice of submitting symbols for confidential informants, it will be impossible to designate any informant by a symbol if he has a criminal record including felony convictions. The indices which are maintained in Mr. Scott's office have in the past been used to record all types of informants, including those used by Division One to furnish information concerning white slave cases, bank robbery cases and other cases involving purely criminal investigations.

In checking lists of informants submitted by Field Offices the writer has noticed that no distinction is made between an informant who is to be used exclusively for national defense purposes and those who possibly will not be used for that purpose but whose services will be used in connection with criminal investigations. It is therefore suggested that when the name and symbol of a confidential informant who possesses a criminal record including felony convictions are submitted by the Field, that informant be given an appropriate symbol the same as individuals who are being used as national defense informants. It is believed, however, that the Field Offices in furnishing these names to the Bureau should indicate clearly that these individuals are not to be used as informants in connection with national defense matters.

Bulletin rewritten 2/17/41 RJB

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-20

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEB 18 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

It is believed also that communications f[illegible] concerning confidential informants should pertain exclusively to one particular type of informant, that is; letters pertaining to national defense informants should not include information concerning informants who will be used exclusively on criminal matters and [illegible] be of interest only to Division One. Attached hereto for your approval is a suggested bulletin.

Respectfully,

R. J. Brandt

Attachment

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EAT:DS

February 11, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Beadon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

A conference was held at the Bureau on February 10, 1941, with the following Bureau representatives in attendance: Messrs. Tolson, Nathan, Foxworth, Clegg, Ladd, Hince, Gurnea, Connelley, Conroy, McKee, Brantley, W. S. Devereaux, Donegan, Sackett and E. A. Tamm.

The purpose of the conference was to discuss ways and means of improving and extending the Bureau's coverage of its National Defense responsibilities. In the interest of brevity I am not outlining your remarks in detail, it being noted that apparently everyone in attendance at the conference took copious notes upon your comments.

Subsequent to your departure from the conference the following matters were discussed in the order indicated and the recommendations made were concurred in by all persons in attendance unless otherwise noted. It may be further stated that each person was invited individually to express his views, opinions and make his observations and suggestions upon each matter that was to be discussed.

66-2542-3-21X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAR 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

I. INFORMANTS

A general discussion was held as to the necessity and desirability of developing confidential informants [illegible] Communist Party, the German-American Bund and within plants, factories and other potential sources of information [illegible] lowing recommendations are submitted:

1. It is recommended that a bulletin [illegible] all Special Agents in Charge emphasizing the necessity for development of informants and sources of information in hotels, taxicab companies, real estate agencies, restaurants, rental agencies, etc. The bulletin should point [illegible] ity of developing sources of information within these [illegible] business through the present program of [illegible] members as sources of information. [illegible] tacked [illegible]

RECEIVED

DATE OF REVIEW 3/25/91

2. It is recommended that a bulletin be addressed to all Special Agents outlining the necessity for their utilizing their friends and associates as sources of information. The bulletin should point out that each Agent undoubtedly has family and personal friends engaged in all walks of life in various sections of the United States and accordingly it is desired that each Special Agent through appropriate channels advise Special Agents in Charge of the identity of the individual Agent's friends in various parts of the country with adequate information as to their employment, background, etc. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the Bureau desires to receive data concerning reliable sources of information in banking institutions, brokerage houses, rental agencies, hotels, department stores and in all phases of commercial life. The bulletin described should point out further that Agents in Charge and Agents should also inquire of the friends of Special Agents whether they in turn have other friends who are in a position to furnish information which may come to their attention from time to time to the Bureau. A suggested bulletin is attached hereto upon this subject.

3. Coverage of Communist Party: After considerable discussion the following suggestion is made to increase the coverage of the Communist Party:

2/17/41 P+C letter to Mr. E. J. Connelley, cc-interested offices. CHC

The New York office is to be assigned five men to work under the direction of Mr. Connelley, these men to be placed upon a special assignment intended to develop adequate and complete information concerning the present Communist Party activities in the New York area at the present time. After appropriate identification of the leading officials of the Party, surveillances should be maintained, bank records studied and efforts made to develop through the information obtained reliable confidential informants within the higher circles of the Communist Party. Mr. Connelley would like to use some of the men who worked on the Bridges case in New York City in this investigation, he mentioning particularly Agents C. E. Weeks, W. J. Devereux, L. A. Ducommun and H. J. Cronin.

It is further recommended that the following offices be instructed to assign one man to the investigation of Communist Party activities in that office to the exclusion of all other assignments. The investigation to be conducted should be carefully outlined and should emphasize the necessity for developing accurate data concerning the identity, movements, habits, contacts, etc. of the leading officials of the Communist Party in that area. Reports

are to be forwarded to New York in order that the case may be properly assimilated and as the data are developed, appropriate steps will be taken to induce leaders of the Communist Party to become informants for the Bureau. The offices in which it is recommended that one man be assigned to this investigation are as follows:

Seattle	Pittsburgh
Portland	Cleveland
San Francisco	Chicago
Los Angeles	St. Paul
San Diego	Detroit
Newark	New Orleans
Philadelphia	Houston

II. SABOTAGE

Mr. Connelley is of the opinion that the Bureau can offer no solution to the field for the handling of sabotage cases, he being of the opinion that the matter is solely an investigative problem which must be met by the individual investigator. Considerable discussion was had as to the possibility of enlisting the Labor Leaders in cooperating with the Bureau particularly in the investigation of sabotage cases and the suggestion was made that the Bureau approach the leaders of the American Federation of Labor and the Committee on Industrial Organization for the purpose of arranging some program whereby Bureau representatives would speak to the various Union groups, particularly in the plants on the priority list. This suggestion was generally considered undesirable it being the consensus of opinion that small groups within the various Labor Unions would probably heckle a Bureau representative attempting to speak and would otherwise make the matter so difficult to handle that the Bureau's real message could not be transmitted to the Union members.

It was suggested and the suggestion believed desirable that interviews not be conducted in sabotage cases in the plant where the sabotage occurs. The objection is raised that employees are reluctant to talk to a Bureau Agent at the plant or in the plant offices because of his fear that the other employees will think he is serving as a "stool pigeon". It was recommended

therefore that instructions be issued to the field that interviews with employees in a plant where an act of sabotage has occurred be conducted at the employee's home or at the Bureau field office, or some other appropriate point away from the plant. This instruction will be included in a bulletin to be issued on the subject of sabotage.

It was the consensus of opinion the individual sabotage case must be met by the investigative ingenuity of the individual Agents and Special Agents in Charge. The conference recommended therefore that a study be made of the offices in which the largest number of sabotage complaints are being received and a study made of the personnel of those offices to determine whether there are assigned to these offices one or more Agents with diversified investigative experience who will be available and who will be utilized by the Special Agent in Charge for the purpose of handling the sabotage cases coming into the office. Messrs. Tolson and Tamm will make this study and submit appropriate recommendations for such changes in personnel as appear necessary.

III: CONFERENCES WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

The following suggestions were submitted for increasing the field generally covered by the quarterly conferences with law enforcement officials:

1. That instructions be issued to all Special Agents to seek invitations to address meetings of State Associations of Chiefs of Police, State Associations of Sheriffs, State Associations of Prosecutors, etc., and when so invited to speak upon National Defense subjects which are bound to attract interest and publicity. It is believed that the Special Agents in Charge, if they properly handle such matters, can dominate the picture in these meetings.

2. It is suggested that each quarterly law enforcement conference have a "theme topic", which will relate to some particular aspect of the National Defense, which will be the basis of discussion at the conference. Suggested topics were "Sabotage in Industrial Institutions", "Law Enforcement's Responsibility in National Emergencies", etc.

3. It is recommended that the individual Special Agents in Charge be instructed to seek dignified publicity and photographs in connection with the holding of the quarterly conferences. It was suggested that at the various quarterly conferences at least one person prominent in each locality be invited to make a talk to the law enforcement officers and that this session of the conference be open to press representatives. The Special Agent in Charge should of course act as the Chairman at this session of the meeting.

4. It is recommended that the Bureau send out to some of the larger meetings and particularly those within a reasonable distance of Washington a member of the Laboratory staff with appropriate equipment in order that a talk upon some of the technical aspects of sabotage may be given, together with illustrations of the types of fire, etc. caused by various chemical combinations.

5. It is recommended that from time to time there be prepared a recording of an address by you which has been specially prepared for transmittal to the law enforcement officers, possibly upon one of the "theme topics". These records can then be sent to the various field offices and utilized with the playback equipment which is maintained in all offices, as one of the attractions at a current meeting.

IV. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

1/7/41 letter all SACs CHC

It is the consensus of opinion that there is no leader or prominent figure in the German Intelligence organization in the United States but that the Directors of the organization remain in Germany and operate through individual cliques or circles in the United States.

Mr. Connelley points out that the New York office through the Duquesne case is actively supervising the operations of the Air and Marine Divisions of the German Intelligence Setup in the New York area and that this group has connections which have been established by this investigation in Detroit and Chicago. Mr. Connelley pointed out that the Bureau has undoubtedly conducted investigations of persons in various parts of the United

States who are, have been or will be members of the German Intelligence setup. Mr. Connelley is of the opinion that in each situation where a good suspect is developed, a surveillance should be maintained for a period of many months even though the surveillance does not from week to week produce anything. This brings forth the generally expressed opinion that the individual Special Agents in Charge must evaluate each and every case which comes into their office in order to determine how far they are justified in going in connection with the investigation of each individual suspect.

It was generally agreed that the German Consuls had a very remote association with the actual espionage operations, it being noted that the Consul's activities appear to be confined to matters relating to propaganda operations. Mr. Clegg pointed out that the British Intelligence suggests that in so far as possible Intelligence Groups' operations be confined to small cliques; that the operation of espionage and sabotage organizations of the German Government are controlled from the same organization; that Mexico is generally believed to be the center of operations for all of the foreign agencies interested in operations in the United States; that the British have found that industrial espionage work in Great Britain was carried on by the Germans through service agencies such as those supplying towels, mimeographed services, and other services of a type which requires access to a particular plant or industrial unit by persons not regularly employed there.

The consensus of opinion was that the German Intelligence setup could be developed only through continuing the Bureau's present program of maintaining surveillances of various persons in the Duquesne case and after they establish contacts, of in turn maintaining surveillances and study of these contacts. It is noted that in the Duquesne case the number of subjects has now reached 63.

It was also the consensus of opinion that it would be both necessary and desirable to impress upon each individual Special Agent in Charge the necessity for carefully evaluating each and every German Espionage suspect and determining the amount and extent of the investigation which should be conducted of him.

V. RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE

A lengthy discussion was had of the Russian espionage system in the United States. It may be noted that the New

York office in the Feldman case has under surveillance one Ovarkhan and through his contacts the identity of a number of other people who are undoubtedly Russian Agents are being ascertained.

It is recommended that a technical surveillance be installed at the Russian Consulate in New York City. It is recommended that a physical surveillance be established of the Consulate, preferably through the obtaining of a room in Pierre's Hotel, in order that a constant observation may be made of the persons entering and leaving the Consulate.

It is recommended that steps be taken to have Bureau Agents assigned to participate with the Immigration Authorities at principal ports on the West Coast, in Miami, Florida and the principal ports of entry into the United States on the Mexican Border. These Agents will participate with the Immigration Authorities in the questioning of aliens entering the United States in an effort to spot persons who appear to be couriers, messengers or espionage agents. Persons believed suspicious, having too much money or being otherwise subject to additional inquiry, will be placed under surveillance and study. While nominally this procedure will apply to all aliens entering through the places indicated, actually emphasis will be placed only on able-bodied Germans of Military age, Russians and Japanese.

Respectfully,

Edward A. Tamm

All suggestions approved.
Please take steps to put into immediate operation.
H.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice
Huntington, West Virginia
February 28, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to offer the following suggestion for the consideration of the Bureau.

The Bureau at the present time undoubtedly has employed a large number of persons as Translators and as Special Agents who are of some definite foreign extraction and who were reared among a foreign element in which a particular Field Office may be interested. Undoubtedly, those employees would be able to furnish the names of persons residing in those localities who are reliable and who could be used as informants and as sources of information. For example, I have in mind Special Agent JOSEPH DeFRANCO who comes from Weirton, West Virginia, which is populated largely by Italians and is one of the potentially dangerous areas in the Huntington Field Division.

My suggestion is that each such employee be requested to furnish the names of persons residing in his home community known to the employee to be reliable, and who might be used as a Confidential Informants or sources of information by the Field Office covering that territory. As a matter of fact, it would seem advantageous to have each Agent in the Bureau submit similar information. It is further suggested that those employees of a definite foreign extraction and who come from communities where that extraction is predominant be requested to submit to the Bureau all information in their possession relative to un-American individuals, organizations and activities in those communities.

Very truly yours,

Leo K. Cook

LEO K. COOK,
Special Agent in Charge

Conf. Inspts in Genl. Intell Work Genl.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmv/mc/JC

66-2542-3-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
4 MAR 5 1941
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOLSON TAMM CHF. CIO PERS. FILES

ack 3-20-41 RJB

RJB:EWM

RECORDED 66-2542-3-23 March 19, 1941

Special Agent in Charge
Butte, Montana

Dear Sir:

For your information, I desire to advise that Special Agent Ray E. Lamb, while he was in training school at the Bureau, submitted the name of Dr. Ralph D. Russell, Head, Department of Secondary Education, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, and recommended Dr. Russell as an individual who might develop into a confidential informant.

Agent Lamb stated that Dr. Russell is the key man in the American Legion of Idaho, is very patriotic, and is also quite active in American Legion activities. He was of the opinion that Dr. Russell would be glad to cooperate with the FBI.

If Dr. Russell has not already been contacted in regard to your American Legion program, it is suggested that he be interviewed to ascertain if he is in a position to furnish information of interest to the Bureau and could possibly later be developed into a confidential informant.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/MCJC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Egan
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Nendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
MAR 19 1941
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JJS:JC

RECORDED 66 - 2[illegible]

February 26, 1941

Mr. Ray E. Lamb
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lamb:

Your communication dated February 22, 1941, has been called to my attention by Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg, and I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the information contained in your letter.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/
mc/JC

CC-Butte (with copy of incoming letter)
Mr. Clegg

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Foxworth
Nathan
Ladd
Glavin
Nichols
Mendon
Rosen
Tracy
Gandy

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FEB 26 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Washingto D.C.
Feb. 22, 1941

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no record Ident (Wenton)
2+5 PM
RPO.

Mr. H.H. Clegg
Assistant Director , in charge,
Training Division, F.B.I.
Washington D.C.

Dear sir:

I am Ray E. Lamb of Class #25 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation training school which is now in session. It has been suggested by our counselor, Mr. Valentine, that we submit the names of any person who we think might be a good potential Confidential Informant from our home state.

Acting in accordance with those suggestions I wish to submit the following name and address:

Dr. Ralph D. Russell
Head, Dept. of Secondary Education
University of Idaho
Moscow, Idaho.

Dr. Ralph D. Russell is a key man in the American Legion of Idaho and is very patriotic and active in the work carried on by the American Legion in Idaho. It is believed that Dr. Russell would be very cooperative with The F.B.I.

The Butte Montana Field Office may already know Dr. Russell, I am not sure.

Conf. Infts in Genl Intell Matters Genl

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DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD / MC / JC

Very truly yours

Ray E. Lamb

Ray E. Lamb
Special Agent.

Hart
2-26-41

Lett Butte
3-19-41
Rgl

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT
4 FEB 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CLEGG
FIVE
CHP

March 20, 1941

RJB:KLB
RECORDED 66-2542-3-22

Mr. L. K. Cook
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
700 West Virginia Building
Huntington, West Virginia

Dear Mr. Cook:

I am in receipt of your letter dated February 28, 1941, which referred to the development of confidential informants in connection with National Defense matters and contained a suggestion to the effect that all employees of the Bureau be requested to submit the names and addresses of responsible individuals employed in strategic positions in industry throughout the United States, and who are otherwise in a position to furnish information of value to the Bureau concerning National Defense matters.

It was indeed thoughtful of you to give the Bureau the benefit of your observations and in this connection I desire to invite your attention to Bureau Bulletin Number 9, First Series, 1941, Section D, wherein you will note that a procedure similar to that outlined by you has now been adopted by the Bureau.

I am always very happy to receive suggestions from employees of the Bureau which they believe will better the work of the Bureau and want you to know that I sincerely appreciate your letter of February 28, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Gavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL ROOM
MAR 22 1941
P M
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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mc/jc

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 1347

CHC:LL February 17, 1941

AIR MAIL
SPECIAL DELIVERY

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 PMU/mc/JC ON 7-10-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF ACCOM. PR DATE 10/41

Mr. E. J. Connelley
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
607 U. S. Court House, Foley Square
New York, New York

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY

Dear Sir:

The Bureau deems it necessary to develop adequate and complete information concerning present Communist Party activities in the New York area. Five Agents of your selection will be assigned to you for work on this project as a special assignment. It is desired that these five Agents be assigned, under your supervision, to identify appropriately, by such investigative steps as may be necessary, the principal officials of the Communist Party, and thereafter surveillances should be maintained of these individuals for the purpose of definitely determining the nature of their activities and plans. It is desired that every possible avenue be exhausted to determine definite information concerning the activities and plans of the party officials in question, and appropriate bank accounts and records should, of course, be studied carefully, along with other efforts to develop such information as might lead to the possibility of developing reliable confidential informants within the higher circles of the Communist Party. The Bureau desires that this project be placed in effect immediately, and you are requested to advise telegraphically as to the identity of the Agents desired by you for assignment to this project. (u)

The Bureau desires that the additional field offices receiving copies of this communication immediately assign one man to the investigation of Communist Part activities within the respective field office districts, to the exclusion of all other assignments. Each Special Agent in Charge involved must furnish the matter immediate and careful personal attention for the purpose of assuring that the investigation to be conducted will be carefully outlined to properly emphasize the necessity for developing accurate data concerning the identity, movements, habits, contacts, et cetera, of the leading officials of the Communist Party in each respective field district. (u)

Copies of all reports prepared in connection with this project should be forwarded the New York office promptly, in order that the data can be properly assimilated and coordinated.

RECORDED 24

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CLASSIFIED AND 2842 PMU/mc/JC
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7-10-81
DECLASSIFIED 7-10-81

CONFIDENTIAL

AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF ACCOM DATE 8/5/81

In the above connection, as the information and data with regard to the detailed activities and plans of the Communist Party are developed, appropriate steps will be undertaken to induce leaders of the Communist Party to become informants for the Bureau.

Each office receiving copies of this letter is requested to acknowledge receipt of same immediately, advising as to the identity of the Agent assigned within each respective field division, as well as the immediate investigative steps contemplated.

The Bureau and the New York office must be advised at least once each week with regard to the progress of this matter in all interested field divisions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc-SAC, Seattle
SAC, Portland
SAC, San Francisco
SAC, Los Angeles
SAC, San Diego
SAC, Newark
SAC, Philadelphia
SAC, Pittsburgh
SAC, Cleveland
SAC, Chicago
SAC, St. Paul
SAC, Detroit
SAC, New Orleans
SAC, Houston

(All sent PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ and AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY)

Copy - rb

AG 095 Knight, Wm. N. 1st Ind. ESA
(2-21-41)M

War Department, A.G.O., February 26, 1941 - To the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

JWB

3 Inclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/
mc/J.C

ack 3-15-41 7 gs

Lett to Sen. Key [illegible] 3-15-41 7 gs

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66-2542-3-25

FEDERAL
1 MAR 4 1941
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FILE

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

KEY PITTMAN, NEV., CHAIRMAN
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ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
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JOSEPH F. GUFFEY, PA.
GUY M. GILLETTE, IOWA
BENNETT CHAMP CLARK, MO.
HIRAM W. JOHNSON, [illegible]
ARTHUR CAPPER, KAN.
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ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH.
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HENRIK SHIPSTEAD, MINN.
GERALD P. NYE, N. DAK.

EDWARD J. TRENWITH, CLERK
JAMES A. WHITE, ASST. CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Feb. 21, 1941

General E. S. Adams,
The Adjutant General,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Adams:

Attached hereto I send you self-explanatory letter and newspaper clipping which has been received here from Mr. William N. Knight, 1421 Pegram Street, Charlotte, North Carolina.

It will be appreciated if you will furnish me with the information Mr. Knight desires relative to the newspaper clipping. Kindly return the letter to me for my files.

Sincerely yours,

Robert R. Reynolds

Robert R. Reynolds, U. S. S.

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18 A. G. O.
FEB 24 1941
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MISCL. DIV.
A. G. O.

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

66-2542-3-25

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD / mc/JC

66-2542-3-25

Army Intelligence

It is not being advertised, but the Army has an elaborate intelligence system operating in all defense projects under its supervision.

The agents may be carpenters, machinists, or the bartender at the nearby tavern. No one but the Intelligence Division in Washington knows who they are, not even the local commanding officer.

The agents make their reports to the Intelligence Division by indirect channels. They write a letter, which on the surface would seem to be an ordinary business letter, and address it to a non-existent company at a post office box, or to a firm with whom confidential arrangements have been made.

If it is addressed to an operating firm, it is marked in care of a special department. The letters are then delivered to the intelligence officer.

The FBI is quietly developing a similar system in defense industries not under Army or Navy supervision. Its eyes and ears are war veterans employed in the factories.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/
mc/JC

66-2542-3-25

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

Bureau of Investigat

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

RJB:KLB

February 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: National Defense Informants-General

At approximately 2:30 P.M. on February 28, 1941 Special Agent W. W. Bromwell of the St. Louis Office, who is presently attending the in service school called at my office to discuss generally the subject of developing confidential informants in connection with national defense matters.

He stated that he has only been in the Field approximately eight or nine months and although he has not had a great deal of experience in this type of work, he was interested in it, and he wanted to know if there was any formula or suggestions which the writer could make to him which would assist in locating and obtaining informants for the St. Louis Office.

The writer informed Mr. Bromwell that it is practically impossible to furnish any given set of rules which would apply in all cases, and that it is the writer's opinion that the development of confidential informants depends largely on the initiative of the individual Agent. It was suggested to him that in all of his contacts which he makes daily in the Field in connection with national defense investigations and other matters, he should constantly bear in mind that practically every person he interviews is a potential informant and if at any time in the future he is of the opinion that any of these individuals are in a position to furnish information of value concerning national defense matters, he should, after an appropriate inquiry is made concerning their reputation and background, not hesitate to approach them concerning this matter in an effort to develop them into confidential informants.

RECORDED

Concerning the matter of compensation Mr. Bromwell was advised that the Bureau would consider any reasonable recommendations which are received from the Field and if at any time in the future he believes he is in a position to develop an informant by the payment of sums of money he should discuss the matter with his SAC and if he deems it advisable a recommendation should be made to the Bureau.

66-25423-26

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 MAR 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TAMM CHEVELLE FIVE

Confidential info. Genl.
Intell. Mail - Genl.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmv/mc/JC

March 20, 1941

FJS:PF:AIM
66-2542-3-25

74383

Honorable Robert R. Reynolds
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bob:

In response to your letter directed to General E. S. Adams, The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C., dated February 21, 1941, which was subsequently referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I wish to advise that I have no information concerning the Intelligence System operating in defense projects under the supervision of the Army.

There is being returned herewith, per your request, the original letter received by you from your constituent, William N. Knight.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/
MCJC

Enclosure

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

EG 095 Knight, Wm. N.
(2-21-41)M

February 26, 1941.

Honorable Robert R. Reynolds,

United States Senate.

My dear Senator Reynolds:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 21, 1941, with which you inclosed a letter and newspaper clipping from Mr. William N. Knight, 1421 Pegram Street, Charlotte, North Carolina, concerning work as an Army Intelligence agent.

The correspondence is being transmitted to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, to whose office the matter pertains, and from you will no doubt receive an early reply.

Very respectfully,

E S Adams

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copy for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pm O/mc/JC

March 20, 1941

66-2542-3-25
FJS:PF:ALM

74384

Major General Emory S. Adams
The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your communication dated February 26, 1941, transmitting a letter addressed to you by Honorable Robert R. Reynolds, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. Receipt is also acknowledged of the newspaper clipping and letter addressed to Senator Reynolds by William N. Knight, together with your reply to Senator Reynolds.

The letter from Senator Reynolds has been acknowledged by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 [illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Mendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COPY
hvw

SSR:EW

CONFIDENTIAL

March 13, 1941

65-30919

74382

Special Agent in Charge
New York, New York

Re: FOREIGN FUNDS - GENERAL

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the telephonic conversation of March 11, 1941, with Special Agents A. H. Crowl and N. Frankel of your Field Division by Mr. S. S. Rubenstein of the Bureau concerning the method to be used in designating confidential informants in investigative reports in connection with foreign funds matters.

The symbol or code letters or numbers used for the purpose of identifying a a confidential informant, particularly as to bank officials, can be applied solely to the individual concerned. The identifying symbol will not have to include the name of the bank. Therefore, in all investigative reports in connection with foreign funds matters, the name of the bank from which the information was received may be used if it is believed this will lend more clarity to the reports. The confidential informant numbers of letters will, therefore, only be used to cover the identity of the bank official.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF _____ DATE _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 DMD/mc/JC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECORDED

66-5542-3 27
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAR 18 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 207 MRC JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FORM, II, 1-2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81
9-15-81

DECLASSIFIED BY 2/6 hjo/lj
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, New York

LEB:FW
65-3747

March 27, 1941

52430

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Re: RUDOLPHE GUSTAVE HARCN, with aliases;
ESPIONAGE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent L.B. Brown dated March 27, 1941 at New York City in the above entitled matter in which it is reflected that certain information was obtained from a confidential source.

Please be advised that this confidential source was [redacted] offices at [redacted] New York City. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] was referred to as a confidential informant in the report since he requested that he be considered as such, and wished that the fact that he furnished information therein be considered strictly confidential.

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

T.J. DONEGAN, acting for
E.J. COMNELLEY,
Assistant Director.

RECORDED & INDEXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 APR 28 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILED

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

MMK:YGG

March 20, 1941

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PM/MM
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 2/3 2-13-91 7-13-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

It would appear from information presently available that the operation of German espionage agents in the United States is broader in scope than that of any other foreign country. By this I mean to indicate that the part played by Germany in the espionage field in this country is undoubtedly commensurate with that played by the German Government in the present military accomplishments by the Axis powers. You will recall that last month when the statistical information was being compiled concerning national defense investigations, of the approximately 14,000 espionage suspects then under investigation by the Bureau, about 11,000 of these were German suspects. (U)

I have been giving some thought as to how the Bureau might obtain more complete coverage on foreign espionage agents in this country. Of primary importance should be the close supervision of those cases where there is reasonable indication that the subject under investigation is probably a foreign agent, as distinguished from some individual who is merely pro-Nazi in his expressions. (U)

Recently I submitted an individual summarization of some 382 persons said by the various field districts to be outstanding suspects of German agents operating in their respective districts. While the information received from the field concerning most of these individuals is not convincing, I believe it necessary and advisable to push the field on these investigations in order that it may be definitely determined whether the individuals are German espionage agents. It has been my intention to assign the additional supervisor which I have requested to assist in the supervision of German espionage cases. With this addition, I would have three men devoting their entire time to German espionage matters. Two of these men would be assigned to the supervision of those cases involving the probable German agents hereinbefore mentioned. (U)

"Here are some ideas to be given serious thought. It is gratifying to be getting such suggestions from Supervisors. H."

66-2542-3-29

APR 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Nathan
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Kiebolz
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CH-20

74379 CONFIDENTIAL

Of equal importance in my mind is the necessity for developing contacts with individuals who by reason of their associates and background can work their way into active espionage groups. Various information has been received to indicate that there is not one large espionage group operating in the United States but rather there are a number of groups operating independently and not necessarily known to each other.

I have in mind seeking out such individuals as our principal informer in the Duccase. Furthermore, I believe consideration should be given to a trial at utilizing the services of such men as Albert Grezinski, former Berlin police official now in New York City. I fully realize the danger attached to using such individuals and I have suggested Grezinski only as a type because of his background and former associates. Necessarily we take a chance of being double-crossed by such an individual and the utmost caution and discretion should be used in dealing with him. However, it is my sincere belief that such an individual is the type to be able to actually get at, or assist us in getting at, the core of such espionage groups. (U)

The question immediately present is how we can obtain the identity of such foreign individuals who could serve the purpose I have suggested for Grezinski. I suggest that an informal discussion be had by a qualified Special Agent of the Washington Field Office or by Mr. Thurston of the Bureau with representatives of the State Department to determine just what information is available in their files concerning the background of the political refugees and others who have come to this country or our possessions in this hemisphere from countries controlled by the Axis powers and Russia. From any such data available we could give particular consideration to those individuals who had been prominent prior to their exile, including especially diplomatic, consular and public officials of subjugated countries who, because of their former connections or vocation, would appear to be the best possibilities for establishing contact with or making known the identity of foreign agents in this country. (U)

The thought has also occurred that foreign newspaper correspondents, news reel men, foreign representatives of American business concerns, missionaries and representatives of the clergy should be fully developed as contacts in order that any information they may have or be able to obtain concerning the identity of (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
743390

espionage agents of any foreign country, who they know operated in Europe and may now be operating in the United States, or who they have knowledge were actually sent to the United States to engage in espionage work, will be furnished to the Bureau. Similarly, continuous and vigorous efforts should be made toward establishing confidential informants among officers and members of the crews of American steamships and clippers engaged in foreign travel.

Further consideration is being given to possibilities in this regard by the Espionage Section and additional suggestions will be furnished to you.

Respectfully,

Harry M. Kimball

RJB:SLB
66-8800-30
66-9330-27
66-2542-2-36
66-2542-3-18

April 4, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~ 2842 DMD/mcJC 74377
~~DR~~ 7-10-81

Special Agent in Charge
Atlanta, Georgia

Re: National Defense Informants - General

Dear Sir:

The attention of the Offices receiving copies of this letter is directed to Bureau letter dated February 4, 1941 which instructed all Field Offices to submit a report on the fifth and twentieth of each month, showing the number of confidential informants who are being regularly used by each Field Office in connection with National Defense matters generally.

From a review of the Bureau's files it is noted that the Offices receiving copies of this letter have not yet submitted this report for March 20, 1941 and the report should be furnished to the Bureau by return mail.

This report should be submitted in accordance with Bureau instructions so that it will not be necessary for the Bureau to correspond further with the various Field Offices to secure this report.

RECORDED
Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

3 31
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 APR 8 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gandy

CC - Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, El Paso, Huntington, Juneau, Knoxville, Little Rock, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Diego, Sioux Falls, Mr. Earl J. Connelley

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

MAILED
8 APR 4 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

April 5, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcl5c

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

During the panel forum for the In Service Training Class No. 3, the writer was asked the question, "What is the reason for the Bureau's policy in not listing individuals who have been convicted of a felony as confidential informants in national defense matters?" The writer explained to the Special Agents present that the activities of the Bureau in connection with national defense matters were somewhat different from its activities in connection with general investigative work. It was pointed out that in a great number of cases the Field furnishes information to the Bureau at the Seat of Government, which information they have received from a confidential informant concerning an industrial facility or some individual, and that because of the urgency of the situation the Bureau transmits such information to the interested Government departments in Washington, who are expected to take action in regard to the information. This action on the part of the Bureau is taken prior to the verification of the information by investigation in the Field. It was also pointed out that in a large number of cases where such information was received from the Field it would not be possible to verify the information by investigation, due to the fact that the Bureau would have no investigative jurisdiction. It was explained to those present that the reason for this policy was to eliminate the possibility of the Bureau's being embarrassed because its confidential informants in national defense matters were renowned criminals and felons.

It was also asked, "Is it possible for the Field Office to make payments to individuals for information, if the individual furnishing the information has a criminal record including felonies?" The writer advised the group that the general rule was that the Field Offices could not have any confidential informants in regard to national defense matters who have been convicted of felonies, but there was no rule that a Field Office could not pay for information offered by an individual to the Bureau.

The above is being brought to your attention in order to record what action the writer has taken in regard to an explanation of the Bureau's policy in the above-mentioned subject matter.

RECORDED & INDEXED 66-25425-32

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
APR 8 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

MAY 8 - 1941

66-2542-3-33

N. Rogers received & [illegible]
please [illegible]

633 Federal Building
Louisville, Kentucky

April 24, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Consideration has been given by this office to placing appropriate index cards in the general index of this office, bearing the names of confidential informants. Typist W. L. HORNBACK, JR., who attended the recent Chief Clerks School at the Bureau, has advised me, however, that he recalls receiving definite instructions that the names of such confidential informants should not be carried in the general index. It is to be noted, however, that it might be desirable to include index cards in the general index on confidential informants so that in the event at some later date a complaint should be received on such a confidential informant, it would be immediately ascertained that he was a confidential informant of this office.

Unless his name would appear in the general index, these facts might not be properly correlated, especially in the case of plant informants, all of whose names might not be remembered by the Special Agent in Charge or the Acting Special Agent in Charge.

RECORDED

It is suggested, therefore, at this time that the Bureau again consider permitting Field Divisions to place index cards in the general index on the names of confidential informants. Such index cards, of course, would only include the name of the confidential informant, together with the file number of the confidential informant file, and this information would not necessarily reveal the identity or the activity of such an informant. Of course, when a confidential informant is being considered by a Field Office, his name will be checked through the general index and in that manner any previous record on the informant would be revealed. However, this would not apply where the complaint against the informant was received subsequent to the time that he was established as a confidential informant in the office.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
APR 30 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ON ORIGINAL

Very truly yours,

5-20-41

H. K. MOSS
Special Agent in Charge

HKM/jlk

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

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P
Y
dfs

[redacted]ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA[redacted]N
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FJS:ML

May 1, 1941 JC (U)

RECORDED 66-2542-3-34X 74374

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: SAC, LOUISVILLE CODE JC (U)

AUTHORITY GRANTED EMPLOY [redacted] AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS PER MONTH FOR PERIOD TWO MONTHS. AT EXPIRATION OF THIS TIME BUREAU SHOULD BE ADVISED AS TO VALUE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTINUANCE SERVICES OF THIS INDIVIDUAL/ (U)

b6
b7C
b7D

HOOVER

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2-8-93 REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIMS 1-2.4 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91 7-10-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

OFFICE OF JUSTICE
REC'D MAIL DEL DIVISION
MAY 15 12 42 PM '41

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-

SENT VIA TELETYPE 5:52 P M Per FW

2-8-93
Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on [illegible]

CH-21

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Pursuant to the request of Special Agent in Charge Sears, authority was granted telegraphically April 21, 1941, to Sears to employ [redacted] for a period of one month at a sum not to exceed fifty dollars per week. b6 b7C b7D

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

CONFIDENTIAL

633 Federal Building
Louisville, Kentucky

April 27, 1941.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

74375

UNCLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON 4-22-91
89-1349

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2542 DMH MC JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II 1-42 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-21-91
7-21-81

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

APPROPRIATE SECTION AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF [illegible]
DATE [illegible]

RS: BERNIE SCHMIDT;
JACK GIFFER;
EDWARD STEED;
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Dear Sir:

During the course of an investigation concerning BERNIE SCHMIDT, 429 Russell St., Covington, Ky., [redacted] Cold Springs, Ky., was contacted. It was determined that HUMPHRIES is a World War Veteran, is a member of the World War Veterans, Ft. Thomas, Ky. Post, and opposed to un-American activities being perpetrated in the United States. He has been closely associated with BERNIE SCHMIDT, who until recently was the Educational Director of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Newport Rolling Mills, Newport, Ky. Through [redacted] it was learned that SCHMIDT is a group leader of the Communist Party who is very active spending practically all of his time outside of work hours promoting the Communist Party. (U)

[redacted] has joined the Communist Party upon invitation of SCHMIDT and he is reporting regularly to the Louisville Office through Resident Agent A. J. LEMAIRE, Covington, Kentucky. To date numerous pamphlets and literature furnished by SCHMIDT and promoters of the party have been furnished this office. Because [redacted] is earning but $30 per week when he works full time, due to the activities of the Communist Party, he is unable to earn outside funds as he was heretofore able to do prior to his close association with SCHMIDT. He is purchasing a home and supporting his wife and family of two children on his present income but more and more things are expected of him in the way of donations, subscriptions and travel expenses. (U)

b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN

MAY 8 - 1941

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAY 5 1941
U. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

authority granted

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 12

CONFIDENTIAL

74376

Because of these things and the desire of this office to keep him as an informant, it is recommended he be employed regularly at a monthly salary of $25.00 beginning May 1, 1941. (u)

It might be further stated that [redacted] was recommended highly sometime ago prior to his enrollment with the Communist Party by his post commander to Detectives HAWTHORNE and MARKNEY of the Newport, Kentucky Police Department who were then conducting all national defense investigations of cases assigned to that department by the Louisville Field Division. [redacted] has no arrest record at Newport, Kentucky. (u)

b6
b7C
b7D

It has been fully explained to [redacted] that his joining the Communist Party and reporting its activities to this office will be a matter entirely at his own volition and further that this office has not nor will not request him to join the Communist Party. He has also been fully informed that this office is not in any manner interested in legitimate labor controversies. (u)

In view of the apparent ability on the part of [redacted] to inform regarding the activities of the Communist Party in the vicinity of Covington, Kentucky, it is requested that the Bureau authorize his employment at the earliest possible time by teletype. (u)

Very truly yours,

H. K. Moss
Special Agent in Charge

HKM/jwf
100-100

CONFIDENTIAL

DS

FJS:PF
~~66-2542-3-33~~
RECORDED 66-2542-3-34

May 28, 1941

Mr. H. K. Moss
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
633 Federal Building
Louisville, Kentucky

Dear Mr. Moss:

I am in receipt of your letter dated April 24, 1941, in which you submitted a suggestion to the effect that the names of confidential informants be included in the general index files.

I am always very happy to receive suggestions from associates of the Bureau which they believe will facilitate the work, and I want you to know that I sincerely appreciate your letter.

For your information, the suggestion contained in your letter has been taken under advisement and every consideration will be given to it by the Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 DND/mc/JC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CH-20

42-2-53

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

CC-150

CONFIDENTIAL

BUREAU OF INVESTI[illegible]
[illegible]S DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]

April 22, 1941 (U)

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

RECORDED [illegible] 2-3-35

AUTHORITY GRANTED EMPLOY [redacted] AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FIFTY DOLLARS PER WEEK FOR A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH. AT EXPIRATION OF THIS TIME, THE BUREAU SHOULD BE ADVISED AS TO THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE SERVICES OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

b6
b7C
b7D

HOOVER

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMU/ROC LJC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2-2 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

28-93 83-1343
Classified by 1048 PMU/bjc
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 6-8-94

CODED AND SENT (U)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Lad
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 22 1941
TELETYPE

CONFIDEN[illegible]

SENT VIA [illegible] 6 44 P M Per [illegible]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

FJS:WLS

April 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

On April 19, 1941, Special Agent in Charge Sears of the Philadelphia Office communicated with the Bureau, at which time he talked with Supervisor Harry Kimball relative to the employment of [redacted] as a National Defense informant, and requested Bureau authority to pay the sum of fifty dollars per week to [redacted] for information obtained by her concerning Nazi activities in Philadelphia.

From a review of the Bureau files, it appears that [redacted] is of Polish-German origin, born in Germany, and formerly was engaged in furnishing scalp treatments in Philadelphia. For the past two years, however, she has lived with her husband in New York and at which place she has been engaged as a scalp specialist at [redacted] Bronx, New York.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] is a niece of [redacted] who is the [redacted] prominent Philadelphia politician, and presently [redacted] Philadelphia.

[redacted] was recently interviewed by a Special Agent of the New York Office, at which time she expressed her disapproval of the various Nazis in their activities located in the Philadelphia area. At that time, both [redacted] offered to have [redacted] return to Philadelphiaand open her scalp treatment business and to solicit business from the various German groups, indicating pretended sympathy toward the Nazi cause and to express contempt for the Jewish element in New York, giving this as her reason for returning to Philadelphia. [redacted] was formerly a member of the Deutsch Sangerverein, the Arian Club, the Maennerchor, the Thuenverein, the Banaters, the Arbeiter Verein and the Philadelphia Turnegemeinde.

b6
b7C
b7D

Special Agent in Charge Sears spoke very highly of the possibilities of obtaining valuable information from [redacted] who had returned to Philadelphia and was very desirous of employing her as an informant at fifty dollars per week.

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-2-B-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 APR 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2542 pmd/mc/sc

Pursuant to the request of Special Agent in Charge Sears, authority was granted telegraphically April 21, 1941, to Sears to employ [redacted] for a period of one month at a sum not to exceed fifty dollars per week.

b6
b7C
b7D

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

CC-150

CONFIDENTIAL

FJS:PF

...RAL BUREAU OF INVE...
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. MAY 8, 1941 (U)

Transmit the following message to: ~~ATLANTA~~, ~~BIRMINGHAM~~, ~~BOSTON~~, CHICAGO, ~~CINCINNATI~~, ~~DALLAS~~, DETROIT, ~~MIAMI~~, ~~NEW HAVEN~~, NEW ORLEANS, PHILADELPHIA, ~~SEATTLE~~, SPRINGFIELD

SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY AMSD STATISTICS REFLECTING NUMBER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS YOUR DISTRICT AS OF MAY FIFTH, REQUESTED IN BUREAU LETTER FEBRUARY FOUR, NINETEEN FORTYONE. (U)

HOOVER

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF Class
DATE 8/31/82

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMD/MC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class, FC
DATE 10/6/81

RECORDED

1-2542-3-38
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
7 MAY 9 1941 (U)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Classified by 1042 DMD/bis 2-8-93
Declassify on: OADR

JC

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT VIA M Per

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

52133

dfs

April 30, 1941

FJS:SAC:ML
100-17673-1

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-5-36

CONFIDENTIAL

Assistant Director E. J. Connelley
New York, New York

Dear Sir:

The Military Intelligence Division at Washington, D. C., recently submitted a confidential communication to the Bureau which contained information relative to Countess du Bourg de Bozas, 973 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.

The confidential communication received from G-2 reflected that she first married a Scotsman by the name of McCrindle, by whom she had one child. She was divorced from McCrindle and about fifteen years ago married Count du Bourg de Bozas from France, by whom she had a second child, now a student at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. It further appears that Countess du Bourg de Bozas is presently separated from her husband, who is in France, and who is trying to "shake her down" for a large settlement.

Countess du Bourg de Bozas is between forty and fifty years of age; possesses much useful information; apparently knows many individuals of prominence, and is familiar with the situation in France and the rest of Europe at the present time.

Countess du Bourg de Bazos recently returned from Florida and is now reported living with her father, J. F. Feder at 973 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, telephone Rhinelander 4-5816. Her private telephone is Rhinelander 4-1354.

The office of G-2 has advised that a reliable informant of theirs has known the subject for several years and states that she has an excellent background, is loyal and well informed, and that her information is reliable.

Your office is requested to interview Countess du Bourg de Bazas in an endeavor to establish her as a confidential national

2-8-93
Classified by 1049 DMn/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMN/MC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

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P
Y
dfs

CONFIDENTIAL

defense informant of your office. During the course of the interview with this individual, it should be ascertained if she is acting in the capacity of an informant for the War Department and if it appears that she is, the Bureau should be so advised.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
Director

C
O
P
Y
dfs

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 16, 1941

52475

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

On April 3, 1941, and on several prior occasions, the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, Washington, D. C., has transmitted to the Bureau confidential reports concerning reliable informants.

In the report dated April 3, 1941, which is attached hereto, certain information was set out concerning Countess Du Bourg De Bozas. There is no indication from a review of the report whether G-2 intends to make use of this confidential informant or if they are desirous of this Bureau developing such informant.

The writer desires to be advised if the appropriate Field Offices should be informed concerning this information upon the receipt from G-2 and if the Field Offices should be instructed to endeavor to develope these various sources of information. There seems to be the possibility that in some instances a representative of G-2 will have previously developed the informant and if this informant was contacted by a representative of the Bureau it might lead to some friction between the Bureau and the representatives of G-2.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 DMD/MC/JC

Attachment

RECORDED & INDEXED 66-2542-3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAY 8 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH CHF. CLK.

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 8

52435

(F) DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMANTS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE MATTERS. -- Due to the present national emergency and the continuous possibility of espionage and sabotage and violations of other National Defense Statutes, the Bureau considers it of the utmost importance that informants be developed in those plants which have been listed on the Bureau's priority list for survey attention and elsewhere, in order that any evidences of violations of National Defense Statutes might be immediately brought to the attention of the Bureau. It is absolutely imperative that continuous and strenuous efforts be exerted in order that a large number of informants might be established and that they be developed as expeditiously as possible.

In regard to the development of informants in industrial facilities listed for survey attention, who should consist of laborers who are working in the assembly lines, machine shops, and other productive areas of the plants, it is also urgent that sources of information consisting of officials and other persons serving in a supervisory capacity at the plants be developed, in order that they might assist in advising the Bureau of any evidences of violations of the National Defense Statutes.

The difference between confidential informants and sources of information should be continually borne in mind, and although it is necessary that sources of information be developed, the Bureau finds that it is imperative at the present time to establish a large number of confidential informants. As stated hereinbefore, the confidential informants should be those individuals who are in a position to secure information regarding any suspicious activities which might indicate possible violations of National Defense Statutes or any suspicious individuals who might have as their purpose committing espionage or sabotage in industrial plants.

It is absolutely necessary and imperative that the confidential informants developed in regard to all National Defense work be honest, trustworthy, and reliable individuals. Great care should be taken in the selection of those persons who will be developed as informants. It is not desired that any person who has a criminal record indicating violations of felony statutes be considered or developed by you as an informant. In the event any person with a criminal record including felonies is presently considered by you as an informant, his relation with the Bureau in the capacity of a confidential informant should be terminated immediately and the Bureau accordingly advised.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2854 2pm

NOT RECORDED
66-2542-sub 3-
1mc/JC

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classify
DATE 10/6/81

PERSONAL AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 4, 1941

SAC	ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

DECLASSIFIED BY 28420 md/mc/JC
ON 7-10-81

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has recently received information which indicates that the various field offices are improperly and inefficiently handling the confidential informants which have been established. In one instance, it has been learned that confidential informants visit a field office and there discuss with the Special Agents confidential information which they are in a position to furnish.

It has also been brought to my attention that confidential informants who are relied upon have, in some cases, made remarks to persons outside the Bureau to the effect that the Bureau has an inadequate understanding of organizations which are inimical to the welfare of the United States Government. In other cases, it has been reported that confidential informants have openly revealed their connections with the Bureau and have assumed the role of a special representative of the FBI.

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

It is believed that the various field offices have been very careless and inefficient in the handling of confidential informants, and this is especially borne out by the fact that in some cases informants are permitted to visit the field offices in order to give information which they have secured for the Bureau.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ MAY 5 1941 ★
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAY 12 1941

The Bureau is of the opinion that if an informant is of any worth, his value to the Bureau is seriously impaired if he is permitted to be interviewed in a field office. In order that his

91

identity as an informant of the Bureau might be safeguarded, and in order that he might be of the fullest value to the Bureau, he should be contacted in a very discreet manner at some point other than in a Bureau field office.

The extreme need for the establishment and maintenance of truly reliable, trustworthy and valuable confidential informants, and the proper and efficient handling of such informants by you, cannot be overemphasized, especially during the present national emergency.

It is, therefore, desired that you immediately analyze this situation as it pertains to your office, and that you personally give immediate attention to the correction of any defects in this particular type of the Bureau's activities.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

PERSONAL AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 4, 1941

DECLASSIFIED BY 28428 mdlmc/JC
ON 7-10-81

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
LADD
TAMM, E. A.
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
GLAVIN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
NICHOLS
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

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66-2541-3-

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAY 13 1941

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ MAY 6 1941 ★
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

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It is, therefore, desired that you immediately analyze this situation as it pertains to your office, and that you personally give immediate attention to the correction of any defects in this particular type of the Bureau's activities.

Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROP... AND FIL... ADVISED... SLIP(S) OF... DATE

KRN:MSB

April 25, 1941

Assistant Director E. J. Connelley
New York, New York

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2841 PMD/MAC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, U, 1-2-2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

Dear Sir:

In connection with your assignment concerning the investigation of subversive activities, I would like to have you initiate at once a full, complete and discreet investigation concerning the following matters:

1) Garrison Films, Incorporated.
2) TASS, the official Soviet Union Telegraph Agency in the United States.
3) Extent and ramifications of the trading and espionage activities of Amtorg Trading Corporation.

I desire to emphasize the importance of developing confidential informants in those industries in which there is good reason to believe that Communist infiltration has been effected, and in which subversive activities are being conducted to the detriment of the national defense of this country. It is, of course, to be understood that such informants are to be used for the sole purpose of obtaining information concerning subversive activities, and only after there has been some reasonable showing that such subversive activities exist. This line of conduct does not, under any circumstances, contemplate the investigation of any labor union or any labor organization as such.

It is further suggested that the Bureau's policy be continued and further expedited concerning the development of all available and pertinent information concerning the United Front organizations of the Communist Party on a nation-wide scale.

RECORDED 61-[illegible]-42 [illegible]-40

I would like to point out that real efforts should be made to develop confidential informants in the Communist Party in order that there may be obtained all pertinent and available information concerning the "underground" or "illegal" activities of the Communist Party.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Glass
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

12-17-93 [illegible]
Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED CONSIDERATION REQUIRED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE ON DATE 4-2-94

CONFIDENTIAL

52432

I am reiterating here the importance of developing information in the Maritime industry concerning the extent of Communist infiltration therein. This matter has previously been brought to your attention in connection with other cases.

Continued efforts must, of course, be made in the tracing of Soviet funds in the United States. In this connection, I would like to have an investigation undertaken to ascertain the extent of Soviet pecuniary interest in firms operating in the United States. (U)

I desire also that efforts be made to determine the identity of Soviet Inspectors and Observers now in the United States together with the identity and location of plants which they are visiting and the type of information they are seeking. (U)

I am also desirous of having further extensive inquiries conducted to develop full information concerning the organizational set-up of the N.K.V.D. (Soviet Secret Police, otherwise known as the O.G.P.U.), its leaders, its methods of operation, its objectives, its ramifications, and the methods of transmission of orders and information. (U)

It is also desired that continued efforts be made to obtain all pertinent information concerning the following organizations:

Socialist Workers Party
Socialist Party
Revolutionary Workers League

In addition to the above, it is desired that efforts be made to ascertain the nature and extent of cooperation of members of the Communist Party or Soviet agents in the United States with representatives of foreign nations. (U)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED & INDEXED

May 4, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 2842 PMD/mcj

SAC	ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DECLASSIFIED BY 8412 MCC/MCB ON 6/26/84

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD/mcj
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
DATE OBTAINED FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 UNLESS OTHERWISE SHOWN

Dear Sir:

There are being transmitted to you herewith two lithographic copies of a document issued by the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, U.S.A., dated at New York City, May, 1935. This document is styled, "Outline of Rules and Methods of Handling Disciplinary Cases". The document includes the names of persons who have been ousted from the Communist Party.

This material is being transmitted to you in the thought that some of these persons who have severed their connections with the Communist Party may be in a position to become confidential informants concerning the activities of the Communist Party. It is possible that some of them have reentered the said party. It is further suggested that some of these individuals may have friends or relatives or acquaintances who are now in the Communist Party who might be developed into confidential informants for the Bureau.

The attached document obviously contains information of potential value in the development of confidential informants. It is, therefore, desired that appropriate consideration and attention be given to the attached document to the end that additional confidential informants might be developed by each Field Division.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
MAY 6 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ALL FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
MAY 6 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED

May 4, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmc/mc
JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
LADD
TAMM, E. A.
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
GLAVIN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
NICHOLS
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pmc/mc
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FORM 1
DATE OF EXTENSION FOR 7-10-81
DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-81

DECLASSIFIED BY 8942 wcb/dcg
ON 6/26/84

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Sir:

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The attached document obviously contains information of potential value in the development of confidential informants. It is, therefore, desired that appropriate consideration and attention be given to the attached document to the end that additional confidential informants might be developed by each Field Division.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ MAY 6 1941 ★
P M
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ure
New York
Assistant Director E. T. Connelley

eral Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Birmingham, Alabama
April 16, 1941

EPG:RLG

52430

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 PMW/MC/JC

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing herewith, "Outline of Rules and Methods of Handling Disciplinary Cases," including the names of persons who have been ousted from the Communist Party, dated May, 1935, which pamphlet was turned over to me by Mr. W. R. SIMS, Chief Deputy, Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company, Birmingham.

Mr. Sims desires this to be returned to him as soon as possible, and the same is being submitted to the Bureau for examination. If the Bureau has not previously been furnished with this information, it is thought the Bureau may desire to have same photostated so that the original may be returned to this office.

Very truly yours,

E. P. Guinane

E. P. GUINANE,
Special Agent in Charge.

ENC. REGISTERED

Conf. Rights in Genl. Intelligence Matters - general

4/28/41
Sec. Birmingham
All - Sec. Smith
TRM

RECORDED

66-2542-3-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 APR 21 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE

AMT:EBK May 5, 1941

52427

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

Mr. G. E. Sterling of the Federal Communications Commission advised on May 3, 1941, that recently a Bureau Agent had approached Mr. Joe H. McKinney, Supervisor of the Gulf States Monitoring Area, Federal Communications Commission, Box 199, Kingsville, Texas, and requested Mr. McKinney to furnish the names of F.C.C. employees who are members of the A.F. of L. A.C.A. Union and who are in a position to furnish information concerning the activities of Communists in that Union. Mr. McKinney has referred this request to officials of the F.C.C. in Washington. In making this reference, he transmitted copies of a number of letters addressed to him by one of his employees, James J. Delaney, as well as letters exchanged between Delaney and one Karl Barslag. Photostatic copies of these communications were furnished the writer by Mr. Sterling.

Mr. McKinney advised that Delaney had a wealth of information concerning the activities of the Communists in the A.C.A. He stated that there was absolutely no question as to Delaney's loyalty and suggested that he would be a valuable informant for the Bureau. Mr. Sterling stated that the F.C.C. had no objection to the Bureau's using Delaney as an informant and stated that he could be contacted through Mr. McKinney.

Respectfully,

A. H. Thurston

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmo/mc/JC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2642-3-42
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MAY 13 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FOXWORTH FILE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 12

FCH:MK:hmg

May 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

There is attached herewith a proposed bulletin regarding confidential informants. It will be noted that this bulletin has incorporated all of the instructions and policies of the Bureau regarding confidential informants, and an attempt has been made to clearly define confidential informants and also to differentiate between general investigative informants, plant informants, and general national defense informants.

In view of the tremendous program of the Bureau at the present time of establishing and maintaining various confidential informants, it is believed that this program is of such importance that the field should have detailed instructions which will remove any misunderstanding on the part of the field in regard to this program of the Bureau.

It is recommended that when the Bureau Manuals are revised again, a section incorporating the provisions of this bulletin be included as a separate section on informants.

This bulletin deals not only with the administrative features of confidential informants, but also the Bureau policies as to the establishment of informants, the maintenance of informants, and suggestions as to the securing of informants. It will be noted that this bulletin establishes three distinct types of informants, namely (1) confidential national defense informants, (2) confidential general investigative informants, and (3) confidential plant informants.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Mendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

I ENCL R

RECORDED

INDEXED

66-2542-3-41

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 14 1941 A. M.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FOXWORTH

FILE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

CH-5

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 2

CONFIDENTIAL

15

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

May 15, 1941

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 17
First Series 1941

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

The following observations, suggestions and instructions are submitted:

(A) NEUTRALITY ACT. -- On April 15, 1941, President Roosevelt, by Presidential Proclamation, extended the Neutrality Act regulations to include the countries of Hungary and Yugoslavia.

These countries are now considered as belligerents within the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pmv/mc/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class. FI2
DATE 10/6/81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY Spb bja/bjs
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(B) NEUTRALITY ACT. -- On April 14, 1941, the President, pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense," issued a proclamation indicating that "machinery" shall require a license for export on and after April 15, 1941.

On April 15, 1941, by virtue of the Military Order of July 2, 1940, and Executive Order of March 15, 1941, the Administrator of Export Control determined that machinery shall include the following forms, conversions and derivatives:

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY

Construction and conveying machinery:
- Excavators and power shovels
- Dredging machinery
- Cranes with swinging booms
- Other cranes
- Hoists, except mining
- Derricks, except mining

Mining, well, and pumping machinery:
- Mining and quarrying machinery:
- Mine hoists and derricks

On April 17, 1941, the Administrator of Export Control determined that machinery shall also include the following forms and derivatives and shall be subject to export control on and after May 6, 1941:

Other industrial machinery:
- Ball bearings and parts
- Roller bearings and parts
- Balls and Rollers for bearings

On April 14, 1941, the President issued another proclamation indicating that the following articles and materials shall require a license for export on and after May 6, 1941:

(1) Vegetable fibers and manufactures
(2) Theobromine
(3) Caffein
(4) Sodium Cyanide
(5) Calcium Cyanide
(6) Casein

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On April 17, 1941, the Administrator of Export Control determined that the following forms, conversions and derivatives of articles and materials listed in previous Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders shall be subject to export control on and after May 6, 1941:

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TEXTILE FIBERS AND MANUFACTURES

Vegetable Fibers and Manufactures
- Unmanufactured:
  - Hemp
  - Sisal or Henequen
  - Istle or Tampico
  - Ramie
  - Sunn
- Manufactures:
  - Hamp yarn, twine, cord, and cordage
  - Sisal or henequen yarn, twine, cord, and cordage
  - Istle or tampico yarn, twine, cord, and cordage
  - Ramie yarn, twine, cord, and cordage
  - Sunn yarn, twine, cord, and cordage
  - Oakum

CHEMICALS

Chemical Specialties
- Calcium compounds:
  - Calcium cyanide

Industrial chemicals
- Theobromine:
  - Theobromine
  - Theobromine salts and compounds
- Sodium Compounds:
  - Sodium Cyanide
- Caffein:
  - Caffein
  - Caffein salts and compounds
- Casein:
  - Casein

METALS AND MANUFACTURES

Nonferrous Metals
- Lead, including antimonial lead:
  - Ore, matte and base bullion
  - Pigs and bars
  - Sheets, pipes, bends
  - Solder
- Manufactures:
  - Anodes
  - Cable (all types)
  - Castings
  - Caulking yarn
  - Circles, discs, and rings
  - Flanges (roof flanges)
  - Foil, including lead and lead-tin foil
  - Laminated lead

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Plate or battery plates (not assembled as complete battery units)
Plugs
Powdered and granulated lead
Sash and scale weights
Scrap and residues, including battery mud
Sections
Shrapnel
Shot
Sinkers
Strips
Tape
Washers
Wire
Wool

CHEMICALS

Pigments
- Lead pigments
  - Red lead
    - Dry
    - In Oil
- Litharge
- White lead:
  - Dry (basic lead carbonate)
  - In oil
- Orange mineral
- Sublimed lead (basic lead sulfate)
  - Dry
  - In oil
- Cadmium pigments
  - Cadmium sulfide
  - Cadmium lithopone
- Carbon black, including gas black
- Chrome pigments containing 10% or more chromium, Chromic oxide (chrome green), lead chromate (Chrome yellow), and zinc chromate.
- Titanium pigments
  - Titanium dioxide
- Zinc pigments
  - Zinc oxide, including leaded zinc oxide
- Zinc sulfide
- Lithopone

MISCELLANEOUS

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Optical elements, excluding ophthalmic lenses used in spectacles and eye glasses
- Lenses
- Prisms

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Instruments:

Fire control instruments, military searchlights, aerial cameras, and other types of military equipment containing optical elements, include only:

All apparatus or parts thereof for detecting, sighting or determining position of a surface, sub-surface, or aerial target.

All apparatus or parts thereof for computing ballistics, positioning or otherwise directing the fire of guns, torpedoes, bombs, depth charges, mines or other offensive weapons to include specifically:

Range and height finders
Range finder trainers
Position finders
Telescopes
Binoculars, including prism binoculars, opera, field and marine glasses
Sights
Gunner's and range quadrants
Aiming circles
Azimuth instruments
Spotting instruments
Periscopes
Magnetic and gyroscopic compasses
Computing sights
Lead computer
Gun directors
Range keepers or other ballistic computing mechanisms
Gyroscopic stabilizing elements
Sound locators for aircraft and binaural trainers therefor
Control apparatus for positioning guns
Directors and range finders
Fuse setters
Self-synchronous transmitters and indicators such as selsyns and synchro units and switchboards therefor
Plotting boards
Range correction boards
Searchlights and airport beacons
Sound and flash ranging apparatus
Bomb sights
Driftmeters
Automatic pilot for aircraft
Submarine listening devices
Aerial cameras
Sun cameras
Navigational instruments including marine chronometers, defined as ship chronometers, not including watches with detent escapement, beating half-seconds, designated to run 65 hours without winding, and with faces graduated 0 to 12.

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All apparatus containing precision optical systems
Aircraft pilot trainers:
Trainers for ground instruction of pilots, student pilots, and combat crews for aircraft in instrument flying, navigation, bombing, or gunnery
Arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in the President's Proclamation of May 1, 1937

It is to be noted that the articles and materials previously made subject to export control have already been furnished to the field by bulletin form and that the articles and materials listed herein, therefore, bring the previous lists up to date.

It is also to be noted that Section 6 of the Act entitled "An Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense" mentioned above, which was approved on July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

> SEC. 6. Whenever the President determines that it is necessary in the interest of national defense to prohibit or curtail the exportation of any military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or materials, or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing, or operation thereof, he may by proclamation prohibit or curtail such exportations, except under such rules and and regulations as he shall prescribe. Any such proclamation shall describe the articles or materials included in the prohibition or curtailment contained therein. In case of the violation of any provision of any proclamation, or of any rule or regulation, issued thereunder, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The authority granted in this section shall terminate June 30, 1942, unless the Congress shall otherwise provide.

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(C) CHARACTER OF CASE ON SPECIAL INQUIRY INVESTIGATIONS. -- This is to advise that the Bureau desires to give particular and expeditious attention to all requests for investigations received from other Governmental Agencies. In order that the investigative reports reflecting investigations of such cases may be readily identified and given preferred attention at the Seat of Government and in the various Field Offices, you are directed to add the following designation to the usual caption of such cases: "SPECIAL INQUIRY (NAME OF DEPARTMENT REQUESTING INQUIRY)".

This will, of course, be in addition to the usual caption and will in no way affect existing rules for entitling reports or letters and indicating thereon the particular classification under which the investigation is being conducted.

For example, an internal security investigation conducted at the request of the State Department concerning Mr. John Doe who is accused of possessing German sympathies would be properly captioned as follows:

JOHN DOE;
INTERNAL SECURITY - G;
SPECIAL INQUIRY (STATE DEPARTMENT)

This practice will apply to requests for investigations previously received at the various Field Offices from the Bureau wherein it is indicated that inquiry is being made at the request of some other Governmental Agency. This rule will also apply to cases wherein investigation is being conducted as a matter of cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or some other police agency.

Investigations of this kind must be given careful and expeditious attention and a comprehensive report in every instance must be forwarded to the Bureau at the earliest possible date. Undeveloped leads which are set out from these reports must be carefully followed and each investigation must be brought to a logical conclusion. Particular care should be taken to protect the identity of sources of information which may be mentioned in such reports.

Previous Bureau instructions relative to the captions to be carried on reports reflecting the results of Hatch Act investigations are in no way affected by this bulletin.

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(D) PLANT SURVEY. -- In connection with the conducting of plant surveys and the preparation of survey reports, the Bureau desires to caution Agents making surveys that it is of extreme moment that the subject of fire-fighting equipment be considered of prime importance in any industrial protection program. Agents should take into account the adequacy of this equipment to handle temporarily or completely any fire that might break out.

The capacity of the gravity tank and the proper distribution of sprinkler heads, as well as alternative sources of water in the event of the exhaustion of the water supply or the destruction of the tank, should be considered. The number, location, and types of portable equipment are likewise important factors. Changes in the operations conducted in the various sections of industrial plants or alterations in the physical setup of the plant, made subsequent to the construction thereof, have in many instances antiquated what was originally an adequate protective system.

It is further pointed out that survey reports seldom describe the condition of roofs from the standpoint of fire hazards. This observation has also been made with respect to the treatment that is afforded the condition of chimneys and flues. While it is realized that these reports should only treat with hazardous conditions, it is nevertheless felt that since the National Fire Protection Association in its annual report for 1940, stated that sparks landing on roofs were the second largest cause of all fires, and that the third largest number of fires resulted from defective and overheated chimneys and flues, these points are possibly being inadequately treated or completely overlooked. Agents should keep these facts in mind when conducting surveys.

It is equally important that plant officials and others entrusted with confidential information in connection with national defense production guard this information from persons not authorized to receive it. To this end, Agents should include in their reports recommendations that the various plant officials be cautious when furnishing information by telephone. They should be definitely certain of the identity of the person to whom they are talking and of his authority to receive such information.

Along this same line, recommendations should also be made that plant managers should use caution when communicating with firms outside of the United States or within the United States so as not to disclose confidential plans or information which may be in their possession, as a result of their participation in the national defense effort.

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It is also pointed out that plant managers should make certain that all plans and blueprints relative to their plant buildings are recovered from subcontracting services to whom they may be entrusted from time to time, in connection with the remodeling of their present facilities.

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The Bureau desires to take this opportunity to clarify the rules and to propound a uniform procedure with respect to the matter of exhibits, in connection with plant survey work. In the future the following rules should govern the submission of exhibits to the Bureau in connection with plant survey reports:

3 Copies of all photographs are desired.
3 Copies of blue prints and other maps and charts are desired if available.
1 Copy, only, of such exhibits as application forms, passes, booklets, etc.

One copy of all such exhibits is all that is required in the Field Office file.

With respect to those exhibits which are to be furnished to the interested Service Agencies in the field, it is pointed out that no specific request has ever been received at the Seat of Government from the Army or Navy authorities for exhibits to accompany reports furnished to their field representatives. The Bureau does not desire that unnecessary expense or inconvenience be incurred by the Field in order to procure copies of exhibits to be furnished to the field representatives of the Corps Area Commanders and ONI. Where requests for exhibits have been made they should, of course, be furnished as the Bureau desires that the highest spirit of cooperation should exist between our Field Offices and the field representatives of the Army and Navy.

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(E) "REFERENCE" IN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS. -- Care should be exercised to see that there is not included as a "reference" in an investigative report any communication or report which has not been furnished to the Bureau headquarters in Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

(F) STATEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS UNABLE TO SPEAK ENGLISH. -- There has been noted recently a considerable increase in the number of cases in which it has been necessary to obtain signed statements from individuals who do not speak or write the English language. An opinion was requested from the Department as to the preferred method of obtaining written statements from such individuals, and for your information and guidance the Department's reply is quoted hereinafter:

> "It is suggested that such a statement should be taken in the language which the person making it is able to speak. An interpreter should be present and translate the questions and answers. The Agent conducting the interrogation should propound his questions in English. The interpreter should translate them into the foreign language. The reply should be written in the language in which the witness gives it and should be followed by a translation given by the interpreter. Such a process will, of course, necessitate not only the use of an interpreter, but also the use of a stenographer or typist capable of taking shorthand notes and typewriting in the foreign language.
>
> "An alternative method would be not to write out such a statement in question and answer form but to take it in narrative form in the foreign language. The interpreter could then make a translation of the statement written out in the foreign language.
>
> "In either event, the translation should be attested by a written oath of the interpreter. Such oath might read somewhat as follows:
>
> > "'A. B., being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is (here state occupation, et cetera); that he is thoroughly familiar with the _____ language and is able to read, speak, and translate the same into English; that he has read the annexed statement of _____, and that the attached translation thereof was made by him and is an accurate, complete, and correct translation of such statement.'
>
> "If the statement is in question and answer form it is suggested that the following clause be inserted in the foregoing oath:-
>
> > "'that he accurately translated each of the questions propounded by Agent _____, to _____ into _____ language.'

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"I suggest that it would be best to have members of the Bureau personnel act as interpreters if there are employees on the Bureau staff available for that purpose. If not, you may perhaps find it possible to secure employees of other Government agencies who can be trusted to make the translations.

"If an interpreter is used who is not a member of the Bureau staff, an oath should be administered to him at the commencement of the examination to the effect that he will faithfully and truly translate into_____ (specify) language the questions propounded by the Agent and into the English language the answers given by the witness."

It is desired that whenever it is necessary in the future to obtain statements from the suspects or witnesses in this category in Bureau cases, the suggestions of the Department be followed.

CONFIDENTIAL

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(G) EMERGENCY CARGO SHIP CONSTRUCTION BY UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION. -- On February 6, 1941, the President of the United States approved Public Law Number 5, 77th Congress, which provides for an appropriation of $313,500,000 to the United States Maritime Commission for emergency cargo ship construction and for other purposes.

This Act provides that this appropriation is to be expended for the construction in the United States of ocean-going cargo vessels; the production and procurement of parts, equipment, material and supplies for such ships; the establishment, acquisition, construction or enlargement of plants or facilities to be used for the construction of ships or for the production of parts or materials therefor, and the maintenance and management of such plant facilities. It also provides that all administrative expenses in connection with the program, including personal services at the Seat of Government and elsewhere, are to be paid from this appropriation.

> "Provided further, That no part of this appropriation shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence:
>
> "Provided further, That for the purposes hereof an affidavit shall be considered prima facie evidence that the person making the affidavit does not advocate, and is not a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence:
>
> "Provided further, That any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence and accepts employment the salary or wages for which are paid from this appropriation shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both:
>
> "Provided further, That the above penalty clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law."

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Complaints should be accepted and investigations conducted by you concerning violations of this Act. Such cases should be presented to the appropriate United States Attorney for prosecutive action.

CONFIDENTIAL

(H) DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION, WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY. -- In order that the various field offices of the Bureau may directly refer any cases coming to their attention, which are under the investigative jurisdiction of the Division of Investigation, Work Projects Administration, there follows hereunder a list of the various field offices of the above-mentioned organization, together with the territorial jurisdiction of each:

REGION NUMBER 1	FIELD OFFICE ADDRESS
Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont	Wayne A. Sanders Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 420 Park Square Building Boston, Massachusetts
REGION NUMBER 2	
New Jersey Delaware New York State New York City Maryland Pennsylvania	Clayton D. Hollinger Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 80 Eighth Avenue New York City
REGION NUMBER 3	
Virginia Florida Georgia Kentucky North Carolina South Carolina Tennessee Territory of Puerto Rico	Leight F. Barber Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 1223 Candler Building Atlanta, Georgia
REGION NUMBER 4	
Illinois Indiana West Virginia Michigan Missouri Ohio	Richard Thompson Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 2216 Merchandise Mart Chicago, Illinois

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REGION NUMBER 5	FIELD OFFICE ADDRESS
Iowa Kansas Minnesota Nebraska North Dakota South Dakota Wisconsin	Thomas E. Stakem, Jr. Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 1701 Ramsey County Courthouse Building Saint Paul, Minnesota
REGION NUMBER 6	
Arkansas Louisiana Alabama Mississippi Oklahoma Texas	Paul Hansen Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 1406 Canal Building New Orleans, Louisiana
REGION NUMBER 7	
Colorado Idaho Montana New Mexico Utah Wyoming Washington	Don Hummel Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 500 Central Savings Bank Building Denver, Colorado
REGION NUMBER 8	
Arizona Northern California Southern California Nevada Oregon Territory of Hawaii	Alexander F. Kelly (Acting) Field Agent in Charge Division of Investigation Work Projects Administration 717 Monadnock Building San Francisco, California

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(I) NEUTRALITY ACT. -- On April 24, 1941, the President by Presidential Proclamation extended the Neutrality Act Regulations to include the country of Bulgaria.

This country is now considered a belligerent within the terms of the Neutrality Act.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(J) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. -- The Bureau in its national defense program and other activities realizes the vital necessity for establishing and maintaining thoroughly reliable and trustworthy mediums through which an expeditious and continuous flow of information concerning persons and organizations whose activities are inimical to the national defense will be available to the Bureau.

This Bulletin has as its purpose the clarification of any confusion that might exist in connection with this essential phase of the Bureau's work, and the instructions contained herein supersede all previous instructions which have been issued on this subject matter, with the exception of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants, and Contacts."

For the purpose of clarification, confidential informants have been classified into the following three types:

1. CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS
2. CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
3. CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

For further purposes of clarification, the following definitions are set forth, and hereafter the three types of confidential informants will be referred to as set forth in the preceding paragaph:

CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present criminal activities or affiliations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning criminals or any persons or organizations who have been, are, or anticipate violating general criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, such as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, the White Slave Traffic Act, the Bank Robbery, Kidnaping, Impersonation and Extortion Statutes, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, such as information concerning sabotage, espionage, Neutrality Act violations, Selective Service violations, and all subversive activities including information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, or any other so-called anti-American "isms."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations and their location in industrial facilities are

CONFIDENTIAL

in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, particularly in regard to the individual plants appearing on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, such as information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, etc., and particularly concerning sabotage and espionage in the industrial plants appearing on the Bureau's priority list.

In view of the fact that the Bureau is charged with the responsibility of investigating violations of espionage, sabotage, and other violations affecting the national defense, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the extreme necessity of establishing and maintaining, immediately, without any delay, reliable informants who will be in a position to inform the Bureau of any activities in which it is interested. The responsibility of investigating general violations of Federal Statutes over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction and national defense matters is definitely placed with each Special Agent in Charge, and it is his duty to be informed currently and immediately of all activities regarding violations over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction

Because of the peculiar nature of the Bureau's activities in regard to national defense matters, no CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT shall be established and maintained by any field office if such person or persons have been convicted of a felony.

In the event there is any individual who is presently carried in a field office as a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT who has been convicted of a felony, the Bureau should be advised immediately and this individual should be removed as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in that office. However, these instructions should not be construed to discourage the receipt of information regarding national defense matters from any individual, regardless of whether he has been convicted of a felony or not, who voluntarily offers such information to the Bureau. However, if such information is received by the field office and transmitted to the Bureau, the Bureau should be advised of the identity of the individual who voluntarily offered such information, and a general statement should be set out as to his character, reputation, reliability, and whether or not he has previously been convicted of a felony, in order that the Bureau might evaluate the information and be on notice as to the individual's character, reliability, and background.

CONFIDENTIAL

PROGRESS REPORTS

In order that the Bureau may be currently advised of the activities of the various field offices in the development and maintenance of reliable CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, it is suggested that effective immediately a report be submitted to the Bureau on the 20th of each month reflecting the total number of informants developed by each field office. Two separate and distinct reports should be furnished, namely:

A report on the total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, broken down into the following:

1. Number of informants regarding German or Nazi activities
2. Number of informants regarding Italian or Fascist activities
3. Number of informants regarding Communist actitities
4. Number of informants regarding Japanese activities
5. Number of informants regarding activities of other nationalistic groups
6. Number of informants regarding general un-American activities not falling within the first five groups
7. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS developed by the field office (the total of items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)

A separate report should be submitted reflecting the total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed by the field office in the industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, indicating

1. The name of the plant
2. Location of the plant
3. Total number of employees in the plant
4. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in each plant
5. The grand total of all CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in all industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list located in the field office district

ESTABLISHING RELIABILITY AND REPUTATION OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

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Before an individual is designated and carried as a regular confidential informant in the field office, appropriate discreet inquiries should be made in order to secure information concerning his background, patriotism, reliability, integrity, and general reputation in the community. Information including data concerning

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record, should be submitted to the Bureau, together with the individual's full name - first name, middle name, and surname - together with the date and place of birth and the field office symbol number assigned to the individual, the latter information being desired by the Bureau in order that an accurate search may be made through the records of the Bureau concerning the individual. The above described information regarding such individuals should be submitted to the Bureau only in letter form. It should be definitely borne in mind that the full responsibility in the establishing of the fact whether an individual possesses a criminal record rests with the field.

If there are any individuals presently carried by a field office as CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who have not been appropriately investigated in line with the above instructions, and although their names have been submitted to the Bureau previously, appropriate inquiries should be made concerning them and the information should be submitted to the Bureau at once under confidential cover. Special concerted efforts should be made immediately so that the information mentioned above concerning each CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT carried in each field office will be transmitted to the Bureau immediately.

The above instructions regarding the investigation, selection, and submission of information to the Bureau concerning CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS does not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

In view of the fact that the Bureau does not have jurisdiction over the investigation of intelligence matters on Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., it is not desired that CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS be established among Army or Navy personnel or in Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., unless the field office is specifically instructed to develop such informants in such establishments by the Bureau. The instructions contained in this paragraph do not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

FIELD OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

That portion of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants, and Contacts" shall remain unchanged but shall not apply to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS.

In addition to the file mentioned in Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, there shall be maintained in each field office a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS. The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be arranged alphabetically by state and alphabetically by plant behind

CONFIDENTIAL

each state, with the cards for each plant informant being filed alphabetically behind the card denoting the name of each plant.

The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS should be indexed as to the types of information which they are capable of furnishing the Bureau.

These files should be maintained in a confidential manner, and care should be exercised so that the identity of the informants will not be disclosed to persons outside the Bureau. The files pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should, however, be available to Special Agents, but should be locked when they are not in use. It is realized that with the large number of informants presently being developed in connection with national defense matters, it will be physically impossible for all of the index cards to be maintained in the exclusive possession and under the direct supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. These files may be maintained in drawers of the regular card index cabinet.

In the event there are any CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who should be contacted exclusively by a specified Agent of the field office, the card pertaining to such informants should be kept in the exclusive possession and under the personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. In such cases, however, a reference card should be placed in the general card index file as to the location of the informants and the type of information which they might be able to furnish, without disclosing their identity, in such a way that the Special Agent who might be desirous of using such informants might be placed on notice that such cards are under the exclusive personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge.

The index cards, as in the past, should contain the names and addresses of the individuals, organizations and concerns with which they are connected, and an indication of the particular type of information which might be expected. In addition to this information, the cards should also indicate whether the informant is paid, and if so, the date when payment was first authorized, the amount of compensation, and whether payment is on a regular or intermittent basis. If the informant has in the past been designated by symbol, that symbol should also appear on the card.

CONFIDENTIAL

If for any reason the services of an informant are discontinued, the card should remain in the appropriate file and a notation should appear on the card to the effect that the services of the informant have been discontinued as of a certain date. This procedure is necessary so that informants referred to by symbols in reports may be subsequently identified even though their services have been discontinued by the field office. When the services of an informant have been discontinued, the Bureau should be immediately notified so that a similar notation may be made on the

CONFIDENTIAL

index card which is maintained in the Bureau. When a symbol number is assigned to a particular informant, and the services of that informant are later discontinued, the symbol number should not be used again, but should be considered a dead number.

In order to facilitate the work of the Special Agents in the field offices, a cross-reference 3/5 card index file should be maintained of symbol numbers assigned to confidential informants, which cards should be maintained in a separate drawer and should be arranged numerically as to the symbol number assigned to the informant. This will assist the Special Agents in identifying confidential informants who are referred to in reports and other serials by symbol number only.

When any correspondence is addressed to the Bureau concerning informants, it should clearly designate whether the communication is in reference to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and information concerning only one of the three types of informant should be contained in any one communication. In other words, one communication to the Bureau should not set forth information concerning both CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and PLANT INFORMANTS, etc.

REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE CONTAINING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY INFORMANTS

In the past, certain field offices have followed the practice of merely forwarding to the Bureau information or reports furnished by confidential informants without indicating what action is contemplated by the field in connection therewith, and in some cases have not retained a copy of the reports of the confidential informants. In the future, cover letters transmitting such information should specifically indicate what action is contemplated by the field office relative to each item contained therein. If informants furnish reports concerning violations and individuals, which information is not related, these should be transmitted to the Bureau by separate cover letters, so that the information may be appropriately handled in the Files Section of the Bureau.

All communications addressed to the Bureau concerning confidential informants should be transmitted under confidential cover. The identity of confidential informants who have furnished information to the field office, which information is included in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau, should not be revealed in the reports, but reference should be made to the informants by means of the field office symbols assigned to them. The Bureau will have been advised previously of these symbols if the individuals are carried as regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and the Bureau will be in a position to quickly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ascertain from its records the identities of the individuals who furnished the information.

In the case of information furnished the field office by an individual who is not carried as a regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANT, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT, and whose identity should not be made known to persons outside the Bureau, the identity of such individual should not be disclosed in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau. In such cases, it will be necessary for the individual to be given a temporary symbol, and the first letter of this symbol should be the letter "T." The Bureau of course in these cases must be advised by a separate communication marked "Confidential," reflecting the identity of such individuals referred to in reports.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS shall not be developed through contact with the plant managements. All CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in the future shall be developed without the knowledge of such officials and through direct contacts with the prospective informants by the Agents of the field offices. It is only necessary to develop CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in those plants which appear on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, and the development of a necessary number of informants in any given plant should not be delayed awaiting the actual survey of the facility. This instruction, however, should not be construed to discourage the development of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS in plants and in other establishments not listed on the Bureau's plant survey priority list.

In order that the Bureau's records regarding CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS might be kept in a current status, the field office should transmit to the Bureau immediately the complete background information required as hereinbefore stated concerning the prospective informant after he has been interviewed and has agreed to cooperate with the field office. This information should not be withheld by the field office until like information has been developed concerning each and every CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in the field office district.

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be specifically advised that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships, and they should be informed that the Bureau is desirous of securing information concerning possible espionage or sabotage, or any information which would indicate a violation of Federal Statutes within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction, or which would be of interest to the Bureau in connection with the safeguarding of the internal security of the United States. A record should be made in each field office reflecting that each CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT developed has been so specifically advised. The Bureau wishes that

CONFIDENTIAL

this matter be clearly pointed out to the prospective CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS so that there will be no misunderstanding regarding the Bureau's position in regard to this matter.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

Individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program are purely sources of information, and they should not be referred to as confidential informants or given symbols as such until they have assumed the full status of a confidential informant of one or more of the three classifications mentioned hereinbefore, and are reporting regularly to your office concerning matters which pertain to the national defense generally or are of interest to your office in connection with criminal investigations. It is possible of course that certain of the individuals interviewed in connection with that program may later be developed to the point where they may be considered as confidential informants in one or more of the three aforementioned classifications. In the event they are developed to the point where they could logically be termed CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, the Bureau should be furnished the complete background information required for such confidential informants, together with appropriate symbols, in order that these individuals may be identified by the Bureau in future communications.

It is not believed, however, that all of the individuals so contacted in connection with the American Legion program can be considered as confidential informants, and extreme care should be exercised in order that they shall not be classified as confidential informants until they have been established as such.

Each field office shall maintain a 3/5 card index file containing the names of individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program, and these cards should be maintained in a separate and distinct drawer in order to preclude confusion. American Legion contacts should not be given permanent symbols.

B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS ON PRIORITY LIST

In addition to the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who will include laborers and others who are working in the assembly lines, machine shops, and other productive areas of the plant, it is also deemed urgent that sources of information consisting of officials and other persons serving in supervisory or administrative capacities at the plants, be developed so that they may assist in advising the

CONFIDENTIAL

Bureau of any evidences of violations of the National Defense Statutes. However, the distinction between the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and sources of information in plants should continually be borne in mind, and individuals such as presidents, vice presidents, secretaries and treasurers of plants, plant protection officials, and others who are not desirous of their identity being kept in confidence when reporting information to the Bureau, should be considered only as sources of information, and should not under any circumstances be listed as CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS. The identity of such individuals falling into the category of sources of information in plants should not be transmitted to the Bureau except when the field office reports information furnished by such sources of information, and it is not necessary that the background information, including data concerning character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records be submitted to the Bureau as is required in the case of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, as the Bureau does not desire to maintain records at the Seat of Government concerning the identity of the various sources of information developed in the field.

C. SOURCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMATION OTHER THAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS

Here again, as explained in the preceding subsection, a definite distinction should be made between sources of information in national defense matters and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, and as related before, it is not necessary for the identity of such national defense sources of information to be furnished to the Bureau; nor is it necessary for background information, including character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records to be furnished to the Bureau. For your assistance in distinguishing between CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and National defense sources of information, it might be well to point out that a member of the Communist Party who is furnishing information regarding the activities of the Communist Party and who does not desire under any circumstances that his identity or relation with the Bureau be generally known, should be considered as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, whereas on the other hand a president of a local bank who in the course of his usual business receives information regarding the Communist Party, but who does not desire that his identity be concealed and who does not care whether any person knows that he furnished information to the Bureau, should be considered as a source of information.

CONFIDENTIAL

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In the event representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence or Military Intelligence Division in the various field office districts should request information concerning the total number of confidential plant informants maintained by the Bureau in industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, this information should be furnished to those agencies. However,

CONFIDENTIAL

the identities of the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should under no circumstances be disclosed to those agencies without prior Bureau authority.

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In order that the Bureau might benefit to the fullest extent by the establishment of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, each field office should take the necessary steps to maintain proper contact with such informants in order to maintain the interest of the informant in his capacity as a Bureau informant, and in order to develop such individuals into better mediums of information.

The Special Agents in Charge will be held responsible for the proper maintenance of contact with CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

It is of course impossible to establish any given set of rules or fixed methods of procedure in the development of confidential informants. It is believed that the success of this important work will depend entirely upon the inititative of the individual Agents and Special Agents in Charge.

It is important and absolutely necessary that Agents maintain frequent contact with their confidential informants. This is necessary not only to establish in those individuals complete confidence in the Agent but also to impress upon the individuals the importance of furnishing information to the Agent. Each Agent in his daily contacts and interviews should bear in mind that every individual he interviews is a potential informant. If he contacts that individual on more than one occasion and receives valuable information, in other words if he assures himself that the individual is "able to produce," he should make appropriate inquiry concerning the individual's background and reputation and if thereafter deemed advisable, he should contact that individual relative to furnishing information on a regular basis to that Agent or other Agents of the office.

Each individual interviewed in this connection should be assured that any information furnished by him will be maintained in strictest confidence and will be used only for official purposes in connection with the Bureau's work. He should also be assured that his identity as a confidential informant will be closely guarded by the Bureau. Particularly in connection with National Defense matters, it should be a comparatively easy matter to convince individuals that they should cooperate with the Bureau by appealing to their patriotism and sense of loyalty to the Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

In order to secure first hand information concerning various subversive movements which may affect the Internal Security of the

CONFIDENTIAL

United States, it is necessary that informants be developed within the membership of those groups. There are always those individuals who, because of mercenary reasons, grudges against the groups, or because of their patriotism and loyalty to the Government, will be willing to keep Agents advised of the groups' activities and plans for future activity.

Care should be exercised in the development of this particular type of informant and no information should be divulged concerning any of the Bureau's projects or confidential undertakings. Informants of this type should not be approached until careful discreet inquiry has been made concerning their general background and reputation. In other words, it should be definitely ascertained that these individuals are no longer loyal to the group with which they are affiliated and that they have some definite reason for cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

If it is found necessary to reimburse certain informants for their expenses or services, and it is believed that the information furnished by these informants is of sufficient value to warrant regular payments, you are authorized to expend an amount not to exceed $10 per month or $2.50 per week without prior Bureau authority. In every instance where payments exceed this amount, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Complete background information should be submitted to the Bureau with a definite recommendation by the Special Agent in Charge as to the desirability of employing any informant who is to receive more than $10 per month.

It is the definite responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to closely supervise the activities of all informants under his supervision. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, the Special Agent in Charge should definitely assure himself that full value is being received.

If at any time it appears that the information produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau should be promptly advised. Each informant should distinctly understand that he is not to represent himself as having any connection with the Bureau, and further that any information obtained by him should be secured through his own initiative.

It should also be impressed upon all informants that they should furnish information exclusively to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They should understand that the information obtained by them is of a confidential nature, and therefore should be furnished only to the Governmental agency which has been authorized by the President to accept this type of information.

CONFIDENTIAL

It is important for each field office to have appropriate coverage in each industrial plant which appears on the priority lists which have been furnished to the Bureau by the Army and Navy and in addition to these CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS every field

CONFIDENTIAL

office should exert every possible effort to develop reliable individuals who are in a position to report information concerning possible sabotage or espionage attempts, delay in ship movements, ship fires, and activities on the part of various nationalistic groups.

It is also important that contacts be established to secure information concerning the travel and destination of foreign agents and possible couriers to and from the United States as well as within the continental limits of the United States. Arrangements should also be made to receive advice concerning unusual shipments to and from foreign countries, as well as unusual mail or baggage arriving or leaving the United States. Those offices located on the East or West Coasts should establish selected informants within seamen's groups; shipping company employees; shipping company officers and management; stokers and firemen; longshoremen; dock and wharf workers; draymen; transfer, freight, and taxi drivers; radio operators on ship and shore; scaling company employees; and with the Maritime Commission, commerce and other inspection services.

In connection with air travel, you should develop contacts to keep your office advised of foreign travel, both incoming and outgoing. All ships entering and leaving the United States should be covered. German, Japanese, Italian and Russian passengers should be ascertained from passenger lists and a report made as to their destinations, hotel addresses, passports and visas, and baggage. When such passengers are aliens, the Bureau should be advised by teletype of pertinent facts if they are departing from the United States. If they are entering the United States, the Bureau and the field office of destination should be advised by teletype, including any recommended action.

Arrangements should also be made so that the taking of photographs of locations possibly connected with the National Defense, and other suspicious actions by foreigners and other individuals, will be reported to the field office.

As of possible assistance to the various Field Offices in developing a large variety of confidential informants, the following sources, among others, are suggested:

Telephone companies
Telegraph companies
Beer taverns
Airport managers
Clubs and dance halls frequented by servicemen or seamen
Radio stations
Tunnel, bridge and port police
Banks
Electricians
Sanitation and Health Inspectors

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Munitions and aircraft plants
Patriotic union leaders
Taxicab companies
Chinatown leaders
National Guard
American Legion
Transportation and shipping company police
Light, water, and power companies
Plant police
Superintendents of mail carriers
Credit Associations and Agencies
Fire Departments
Organizations or groups of any kind with large memberships
Hotels
Real Estate agencies
Restaurants
Rental Agencies

It should also be borne in mind that the quality and type of informant developed is far more important than the quantity. Emphasis must be placed on the development of informants who can furnish reliable and accurate information.

Another suggestion which appears to possess considerable merit is that there be recorded in each field division as sources of information friends or associates of Special Agents, who because of the nature of their employment might be in a position to furnish valuable information in the present emergency. For example, persons associated with or employed in the banking business, the brokerage business, and in other types of business having a general contact with the public, might well be informed by Special Agents who are related to or associated with them of the types of information which the Bureau is desirous of securing at this time.

The Bureau has recently furnished each field office with, (1) "List of Important Plants having Contracts with the British Purchasing Commission," and (2) a list of "Civilian Constructed and Operated Plants." It is desired that these two lists be considered by you as a part of the Bureau's priority list in so far as the development of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS is concerned, and the instructions contained hereinbefore apply equally to these two lists.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

CONFIDENTIAL

Director

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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dfs

PEF:CSH

May 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Drayton, Carson, Clegg and Foxworth, considered and approved the attached proposed bulletin to the field regarding confidential informants.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

"D.K. H."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-7392X

RECORDED 66-2542-3-42X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 19 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOLSON FOXWORTH CLEGG CLE.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-01-2013
F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 RMD/MC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 2-10-91

MAY 23 1941 (U)

TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR (U) ASSIFICATION ACTION

FBI NEW YORK CITY MAY 23, 1941 9.47 AM AOBS

RECORDED

~~INDEXED~~

66-9342-C-42X1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 14 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DIRECTOR, SAC CGO CV PGPXXXX PG

UNKNOWN SUBJECT [redacted] INFORMANT, INTERNAL SECURITY G. INFORMANT POLISH CITIZEN AND [redacted] GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH ARRIVED NYC MARCH TWENTY FOURTH NINETEEN FORTY ONE FROM BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA, PRESENTLY ASSISTING BUREAU IN OBTAINING INFORMATION AS TO GERMAN , UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND HAS ALREADY VISITED VARIOUS CITIES FOR THIS PURPOSE BUREAU INSTRUCTED THAT INFORMANT BE SENT TO PITTSBURGH, CLEVELAND AND CHICAGO DISTRICTS TO DEVELOP SIMILAR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. INFORMANT LEFT NYC MAY TWENTY SECOND AT ELEVEN FORTY PM EST TO ARRIVE IN PITTSBURGH AT EIGHT TWENTY FIVE AM EST ON MAY TWENTY THIRD NINETEEN FORTY ONE. HE WILL REGISTER AT THE FORT PITT HOTEL WHERE HE SHOULD BE CONTACTED BY A SPANISH SPEAKING AGENT OF THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE USING THE NAME [redacted] LATER IN THE MORNING. INFORMANT SHOULD REMAIN IN PITTSBURGH CLEVELAND AND CHICAGO AS LONG AS HE PRODUCES INFORMATION OF VALEXXXXXX VALUE. FROM PTTXXXXX PITTSBURGH HE SHOULD BE SENT TO CLEVELAND AND CHICAGO FOR A SIMILAR PURPOSE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE PITTSBURGH, CLEVELAND AND CHICAGO OFFICES REVIEW THEIR FILES ON UKRAINE ACTIVITIES IMMEDIATELY TO DETERMINE WHETHER INFORMANT CAN BE OF ANY SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. INFORMANT WILL DEVELOP HIS OWN

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-16016-30

CH-20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO

CONTACTS IN THESE DISTRICTS AND WILL REPORT RESULTS TO CONTACTING b7D
AGENTS WHO WILL REPORT SAME EXPEDITIOUSLY TO THE BUREAU. AT CLEVELAND
INFORMANT INSTRUCTED TO REGISTER AT THE HOTEL AUDITORIUM WHERE A
SPANISH SPEAKING AGENT USING [redacted] SHOULD CONTACT HIM. AT CGO
INFORMANT WILL REGISTER AT BISMARK HOTEL WHERE HE SHOULD BE CONTACTED
AS IN PAST. INFORMANT SUPPLIED WITH A ROUND TRIP RR TICKET FOR TRAVEL
ON PENN RR FROM NY CITY TO CHICAGO VIA PITTSBURGH AND CLEVELAND
AND RETURN. BUREAU AUTHORIZED PAYMENT TO INFORMANT OF TEN DOLLARS PER
DAY PLUS HOTEL RRXXXX ROOM EXPENSES SHOULD BE PAID PLUS SPLEEPING
CAR ACCOMMODATIONS. INFORMANT FORTY EIGHT YEARS, FIVE FEET NINE INCHES,
TWO HUNDRED POUNDS, FAIR COMPLEXION BLACK HAIR BROWN EYES. (b)(4)

DONEGAN

END

CONFIDENTIAL

Glenarm, Md.

RECEIVED
CHIEF SECRET SERVICE

May 28, 1941

1941 MAY 28 AM 8 [illegible]

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Intelligence Dept.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:-

As I am a ship fitter by trade, and worked at the same during the last worlds war, I am thinking seriously of going back to ship yards on defense work, I would like to know if you could use me in your dept. for this emergency.

If you can use me as you know a ship-fitter works not only on the ship but also through out the year in the sheds as well as on the [illegible] where he get his work, in other [illegible] his time is about equally distribu[illegible] from shop to ship.

LL-2542-3-43

I am a man of the highest character with the very best of reference that will stand the fullest and strictest investigation. I am 38 years old 6 ft. 1½ in 225 lbs. I am a loyal American my ancestors and been born and raised here in America for four generations then from Holland.

I am expecting to hear from you on an early date,

Yours sincerely,
William Henry Grafft

FJS:HMW
66-2542-3-43

June 16, 1941

RECORDED

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Special Agent in Charge
Baltimore, Maryland

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF dec Cass, FTS
DATE 10/6/81

Dear Sir:

There are transmitted herewith copies of a letter received from William Henry Grafft, Glenarm, Maryland, dated May 28, 1941, and two copies of the Bureau's reply to him, dated June 16, 1941.

You are requested to have an Agent interview Mr. Knepper for the purpose of establishing him as a Confidential National Defense Informant of your office.

Very truly yours,

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC
ON 7-10-81

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE BY
78

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CH 17

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUN 16 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FJS:HMW
66-2542-3-43

RECORDED

June 16, 1941

Mr. William Henry Grafft
Glenarm, Maryland

Dear Mr. Grafft:

Your letter addressed to the Intelligence Department, Washington, D. C., dated May 28, 1941, has been referred to this Bureau for attention.

The entire investigative work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is conducted by regularly appointed and qualified Special Agents who must be between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-two.

I wish to thank you for the patriotic spirit which prompted your letter and desire to state that your letter has been referred to Mr. H. T. O'Connor, Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore, Maryland, Office of this Bureau. I have instructed Mr. O'Connor to have an Agent of his office call on you concerning the subject matter of your letter.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 pmd U/mc/J.C.

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Foxworth
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Carson
Drayton
Quinn Tamm
Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUN 16 1941 ★
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

78

JUL 28 1941

66-2542-3-44

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-3-14X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcl C

REFER TO FILE No. 162

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
U. S. SECRET SERVICE

May 29, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

There is enclosed herewith for such attention and consideration as you may deem proper a letter dated May 28, 1941, received by this Service from Mr. William Henry Grafft, Glenarm, Maryland, as the subject-matter is not one for the attention of the U. S. Secret Service but may be of interest to you.

The writer has been advised of this reference.

Yours very truly,

Chief, U. S. Secret Service

Enclosure.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mcl

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-43
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 MAY 31 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

KNOW YOUR ENDORSERS
Do not cash Checks for Strangers

FCH:ALM
66-2542-2

May 26, 1941

MR. P. K. FOXWORTH

Reference is made to the attached letter of Special Agent in Charge H. K. Moss suggesting that the names of all confidential informants be included in the general index in field offices, in order that a name check through the general index would reveal that an individual was an informant of the office.

The writer does not concur in this suggestion and believes that the suggestion should be disapproved. It is believed that the procedure outlined in a recent Bureau bulletin regarding confidential informants will establish an adequate index system with regard to confidential informants, and each field office would be able to check all names through such files.

A letter addressed to Mr. H. K. Moss is attached herewith.

Respectfully,

F. C. Mollenson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-10-81 BY 2842 PMD/mcJC

RECORDED
INDEXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 20 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH

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dfs
excerpt

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Cleveland, Ohio

May 26, 1941.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 RM/MC/JC
ON 7-16-81

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DClass/Pk DATE 10/6/81

Re: Development of Confidential Informants
General Investigative Work
Confidential Plant Informants
Confidential National Defense Informants.

* *.

This morning in discussing the matter with Agent DOWD he suggested that a letter be written to the Director asking that all field offices have each agent who is capable of developing confidential informants to sit down and write his experience to the Bureau, the manner in which he contacts, develops and secures information from confidential sources so that all this information might be available to the Bureau for summarization and transmission in the form of a Bulletin to the Field to help all agents in this serious and necessary part of the Bureau's work. I have instructed Agent DOWD to furnish me a complete report of the matters he discussed with the agents at our conferences as I know that it will be interesting and valuable to the Bureau.

I think that other valuable suggestions may be received from other older agents in the field and a compilation such as I suggest I know would be very valuable to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED
INDEXED

66-2542-3-45X1

J. S. EGAN
Inspector

CH-23

RECORDED 61-2542-3 45X

June 11, 1941

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In order that the Bureau might improve upon its program of the development of confidential informants, it is believed that very valuable results will be insured if the Bureau has the benefit of the experiences of the various Special Agents who have been engaged in this type of endeavor.

It is, therefore, desired that each Special Agent in your Office who has been engaged in the development of confidential informants forward to the Bureau immediately his experiences in the development of confidential informants in detail so that this information might be evaluated and possibly made available to all Special Agents of the service for their assistance and guidance in this phase of the Bureau's activities. It is desired that this matter be given your immediate personal attention.

5-22-81
2842 pmvmac Em.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JUN 11 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED

INDEXED

62-3-45A

June 11, 1941

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC

ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In order that the Bureau might improve upon its program of the development of confidential informants, it is believed that very valuable results will be insured if the Bureau has the benefit of the experiences of the various Special Agents who have been engaged in this type of endeavor.

It is, therefore, desired that each Special Agent in your Office who has been engaged in the development of confidential informants forward to the Bureau immediately his experiences in the development of confidential informants in detail so that this information might be evaluated and possibly made available to all Special Agents of the service for their assistance and guidance in this phase of the Bureau's activities. It is desired that this matter be given your immediate personal attention.

5-22-91

2242 pm v ma

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

FCH:WMC

May 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

There is attached hereto for your approval, a proposed letter to all SAC's relative to each Special Agent of each Field Office forwarding his experiences in development of confidential informants in detail to the Bureau.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

Attachment

DATE 5-22-81 2842 pmu mac e/bm

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

CH-21

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June 3, 1941

Special Agent in Charge
Newark, New Jersey

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-10-81 BY 2842 pmd/
mc/jc

Dear Sir:

Special Agent J. T. Murphy of the Bureau has advised that his cousin, Miss Beatrice LeCraft, 28 Duncan Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey, is a graduate of Fordham University, receiving her Ph.D. degree during the past January, and the thesis she wrote in order to receive this degree concerned in a way a comparison between people who can hear and talk and people who are deaf and dumb. In order for her to prepare her thesis, she conducted numerous tests among people who are deaf and dumb and people who can hear and talk, to show the likes and dislikes and mental attitudes of her subjects.

It was Miss LeCraft's opinion that probably individuals who are deaf and dumb might be useful to the Bureau as confidential informants, in view of the fact that they are able to lipread and are usually inconspicuous, and they might be able to pick up a great deal of information by lipreading because individuals talking in their presence are usually of the belief such conversations are not audible to them.

This matter is being called to your attention in order that Miss LeCraft may be interviewed by a Special Agent of your office to develop full information in her possession regarding such individuals who might be utilized by you in obtaining sources of information and confidential informants among deaf and dumb people.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JUN 3 1941
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CH-18

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

FCH:MK

June 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

Reference is made to the attached memorandum of Supervisor J. T. Murphy of the Plant Survey Section in regard to the suggestion of his cousin, Miss Beatrice LeCraft, of Jersey City, New Jersey, for the Bureau to develop confidential informants among people who are deaf and dumb.

It is believed that it should be left to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of each field office to develop confidential informants and sources of information among the different classes and types of people. However, this matter is being called to the attention of the Newark office in order that they might contact Miss LeCraft and develop any information she may have which would be helpful to the Newark office in connection with this matter.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

F. C. Holloman.

Confidential Informants - Gen'l. Intell. Work

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INDEXED

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 JUN 6 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH
FIVE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JTM:WMC

May 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

During a recent conversation I had with my cousin, Miss Beatrice LeCraft, 28 Duncan Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey, without revealing to her the type of work I am presently doing, she suggested a novel idea regarding the development of confidential informants.

She is a graduate of Fordham University, receiving her Doctor of Philosophy Degree this past January and the thesis she wrote to receive this degree concerned in a way, a comparison between people who can hear and talk and people who are deaf and dumb.

In order to write her thesis, she conducted numerous tests among people who were deaf and dumb and people who could hear, to show the likes and dislikes and mental attitudes of her subjects. It was this that brought about the idea that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should try to develop confidential informants among the people who are deaf and dumb.

A reason for this was, that whenever anybody finds out that a person is deaf and dumb, very little attention is paid to them and, therefore, they are capable of doing things and going into places that a person who could speak and hear could not go into.

It is the writer's idea that an Agent interview her in order to determine more fully the information she possesses concerning these people. It is known that she has a record of numerous clubs formed by these deaf and dumb people and it is certain that she will be more than willing to cooperate in endeavoring to bring about the development of these informants.

With this idea in mind, a letter is being forwarded to the Newark Field Office to have an Agent interview her in the near future.

Respectfully,

J. T. Murphy

J. T. Murphy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 JUN 6 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH
FIVE

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

HMK:VGG
65-9180

May 27, 1941

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REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91
7-10-81

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. E. FOXWORTH

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 bja/lyj
ON 4-22-94 93-1343

Previously I suggested that in order to more adequately cover the foreign espionage field in this country, it was necessary that informants be developed who have actually known the identity of such foreign agents. (U)

I suggested that consideration be given to interviewing political refugees in this country where such refugees, by reason of their background or vocations, appear to be in a position to furnish information regarding such foreign agents. (U)

I understand that Mr. E. A. Tamm serves on a committee with representatives of the State Department and other government departments to consider the admission into this country of political refugees from abroad. I understand further that approximately ten agents are to be used to serve on similar committees to pass on the advisability of admitting such political refugees.

It is respectfully suggested that consideration be given to issuing instructions to the employees of the Bureau who sit on these committees considering the admission of political refugees to be constantly alert to determine any of these individuals whom it might be desirable to interview as suggested above.

When the Bureau committee members determine the identity of such a possible informant, the National Defense Division of the Bureau should be promptly informed in order that steps may be taken to have an interview conducted by a representative of the Bureau.

INDEXED
Respectfully,
RECORDED

Harry M. Kimball

66-2542-3-46

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 25 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

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Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
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Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PEF:CSH

June 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The suggestion contained in the attached memorandum was taken up with the supervisors assigned to the Alien Control Division of the State Department and they were instructed to immediately advise of the identity of any persons whom they thought might be desirable for interview, in an effort to develop information as to the identity of foreign agents.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

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DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-10-91 7-10-81

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6 lja/lja
ON 4-22-94
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1 JUN 25 1941
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